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Ernest Gellhornt

An examination of the Federal Trade Commission's treatment of confidential information at the hearing level suggested that the Commission needs to reconsider the bases, objectives, and implementation of
its confidentiality policies.1 This article continues that examination of
Commission handling of sensitive data at a different and earlier stage
of its proceedings. Attention is focused on FTC practices prior to the
hearing of adjudicated matters. That is, what are and should be FTC
confidentiality policies at the investigative and post-complaint discovery stage?
The Commission has devoted inordinate attention to its rules of
practice in recent years. The numerous rule revisions it has made include major changes within a one year period. 2 Despite, or perhaps
t Associate Professor of Law, Duke University.
The assistance of James Alexander, now a third year student at the Duke University
School of Law, and the support of the Duke Endowment in the preparation of this article
are gratefully acknowledged.
I See Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 401, 433 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gellhor].
2 Five changes have been made in the past seven years. The first occurred in July 1961
when, in addition to the continuous hearing rule, the FTC broadened the scope of discovery. It also made interlocutory appeals from a hearing examiner's procedural rulings
and appeals from an examiner's initial decision discretionary. The next change, in May
1962, concentrated on streamlining the Commission's rule-making procedures. Then, in
August 1963, the FTC deleted the "good cause" requirement from its discovery provisions
and provided that a deposition should be authorized when it is shown that it will "constitute or contain" relevant "evidence" and would not impose an unreasonable burden on
the other party or unduly delay the proceedings; appeal procedures were turned around
again and FTC review now became a matter of right when requested. See Mezines & Parker,
Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. Rav., Winter-Spring, 55, 57 n.8,
61 n.23 (1966); Auerbach, Scope of Authority of FederalAdministrative Agencies to Delegate Decision Making to Hearing Examiners, 48 MINN. L. R1y. 823, 833-4 (1964). Partially
in response to the passage of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III,
1968), the Commission rewrote its rules in July 1967, this time providing that a deposition
should be authorized when it is shown that it is "necessary for purposes of discovery"
and that the same information could not be acquired voluntarily. FTC Procedures & Rules
of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (1968), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 7032 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as FTC Rules]. The most recent changes in May 1968 empowered hearing examiners to
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because of, these constant shifts in the Commission's position on discovery and confidential treatment, the FTC's current rules neither

eliminate all doubts regarding the Commission's support of the principle of open discovery nor spell out specific standards for determining
whether information is sensitive and requires confidential treatment

at the pretrial stage. 3 On the other hand, the FTC's adoption several
years ago of the long-time judicial rule of continuous trials converted
basic questions of pretrial discovery from routine determinations of
administrative discretion into inquiries concerning the demands of

fairness.

4

At the same time, courts have expanded requirements of fairness
in accusatory proceedings while confirming the broad scope of agency
discretion in treating confidential information. 5 Although once disputed, it now is a truism that administrative proceedings, at whatever
stage, must meet constitutional standards of that process which is "due"
in light of the circumstances and interests involved. 6 Due process neither demands the best possible procedure nor excuses less than the best.
Rather it sets the procedural Plimsoll line, and the function of judicial
intervention in agency procedures is to draw the current mark and
measure agency process against it. But a critical analysis of agency
procedures need not and should not be so limited. The best possible
procedure for insuring fair play without impeding performance of
agency functions is the standard against which practices will be measured here.
rule on requests for confidential information instead of requiring certification of that
question to the full Commission. FTC Rules § 3.36(c).
3 Compare Kintner, Recent Changes in Federal Trade Commission Discovery Practice,
37 ANTrrausT L.J. 238 (1968), with Stewart & Ward, FTC Discovery: Depositions, The
Freedom of Information Act and Confidential Informants, 37 ANrrrusT L.J. 248 (1968).
4 E.g., Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TR"AE
16,471 (1963); L. G. Balfour & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435 [1961-1963 Transfer
REG. REP.
16,423 (1963); see FTC Rules § 3A(b) (authorizing hearing
Binder] TR"AE REG. REP.
examiners "to order brief intervals of the sort normally involved in judicial proceedings");
18,253, 18,310 (1968).
Universe Chemicals, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8752, 3 TRA E REG. REP.
5 See, e.g., Gellhorn 428-33 (application of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957),
to administrative agency hearings); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); FCC v. Schreiber, 381
U.S. 279 (1965).
6 E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-3 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 809 U.S. 134, 143-4 (1940);
see Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, 54 AA.U.P. Bur..
143, 144-5 (1968). Of course, minimum procedural requirements in other contexts are not
automatically applicable to administrative agency proceedings. But they should be rejected
only when distinguishable on significant grounds. Similarly, procedural minima elsewhere
may not satisfy due process in administrative procedure. See 1 K. C. DAvis, ADMINin-rAuvE
LAw TREATiSE §§ 8.01-.03 (1958). See also Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp.
136, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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As might be expected, the questions asked to determine what constitutes confidential information deserving protection at the pretrial
stage do not vary significantly from those examined in treating sensitive data at the hearing level. However, the policies supporting "public
hearings" are seldom present in the pretrial stage and generally should
not govern disclosure requirements during investigations or discovery.
For these purposes, public disclosure is unnecessary. Investigation and
discovery are in no way adjudicative; they are designed to apprise the
prosecutor and defendant of all available information, to eliminate
needless issues, and to facilitate preparation and presentation of their
cases. On the other hand, public disclosure goes to the essence of a
fair hearing and is indispensable in adjudicative proceedings. The
results, though seldom the rationale, of many FTC cases recognize this
distinction.
A confused and confusing variable standard has been the result.
Complete disclosure to the FTC, subject to uncertain future protection, appears to be the rule of nonpublic precomplaint investigations;
"integrity" of agency files is the byline of secret treatment; "necessity"
or "unavailability," on the other hand, may determine whether a discovery request is granted.
This article gathers FTC decisions governing confidential information at the pretrial stage7 and systematically analyzes the various approaches adopted by the Commission. Exposure of FTC confidentiality
policies on a functional basis should contribute to clarification; explicit recognition of the rationale of these policies hopefully will have
a self-leveling effect. In addition, this article seeks to identify the relevant interests and to suggest standards where current criteria for deciding whether sensitive information should be disclosed appear to be
inadequate. Finally, standards for determining whether information
warrants confidential treatment during discovery are suggested and
methods of protecting such data are explored.
INVESTIGATIONS
FTC investigations are of two types: informative and regulatory.
That is, they are designed either to gather information about an industry or part of the economy as a basis for formulating rules, proposing legislation, or making policy judgments, or to collect evidence
7 The focus of this article is on FTC activities which point to possible prosecutions. For
example, regulatory rather than informative investigations will be examined-although
some of the latter's lessons are relevant, and the principles applicable to pretrial practices
often have broader applications.
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about specific companies in preparation for an FTC complaint.8 Pretrial investigations examined here involve the latter.
A creature of congressional afterthought, sharply restricted by the
courts in the Commission's early years, still used primarily at the call
of private complainants, the FTC's investigative powers are an indispensable weapon in the FTC's enforcement arsenal. Although authorized by Congress primarily for the purpose of conducting broad economic inquiries,9 the Commission uses its investigative powers most
frequently for precomplaint preparation. 10 Investigations usually are
initiated because of complaints to the Commission by an investigated
party's competitors, customers, or suppliers rather than as part of a
preplanned enforcement scheme." But because the continuous hearing
requirement for FTC adjudicative trials necessitates that complaint
12
counsel prepare the essentials of his case before a complaint is issued,
the pretrial investigation is the most significant link in the enforcement chain.
Investigations are usually accomplished voluntarily and without reliance on compulsory process. All investigations are based upon author8 FTC investigations are of two main types: (1) so-called general investigations of

conditions and practices in certain industries or segments of the economy; and
(2) pre-complaint investigations to determine whether particular companies are
violating any of the statutes administered by the Commission. A general investigation, although perhaps it may lead to litigation ultimately, ends with the filing
of a report organizing and analyzing the information collected; a pre-complaint
investigation ends with a determination of whether or not litigation should be
commenced.
Pollock, Pre-ComplaintInvestigations by the Federal Trade Commission, 9 ANTITRUST BULL.
1, 2 (1964); see also Withrow, Investigatory Powers of the Federal Trade CommissionConstitutionaland Statutory Limitations, 24 FED. B.J. 456, 457-8 (1964); Note, Investigatory
Powers of the Federal Trade Commission, 53 Nw. U.L. Rv. 109 (1958).
9 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3-4 (1914); T. BLAISDELL, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 107-20 (1932); Rublee, The OriginalPlan and Early History of
the Federal Trade Commission, 11 ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE PROCEEDINGS 666, 671-2
(1926); Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission,
28 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 720-1 (1928); Boyle, Economic Reports and the Federal Trade
Commission: 50 Years' Experience, 24 FED. B.J. 489 (1964).
10 1961 FTC Ann. Rep. 24-26; see 1966 FTC Ann. Rep. 2-4; Williams, Investigations by
the Federal Trade Commission, 29 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 71 (1965).
11 See Florida Citrus Mutual, 50 F.T.C. 959, 961 (1954); Williams, supra note 10; Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN.
L. RFv. 383, 393-6 (1964). The resulting lack of agency direction has been a subject of
constant criticism. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1951); Gimbel Bros.,
60 F.T.C. 359, 375 (1962) (dissenting opinion); Loughlin, Investigation and Trial of Robinson-Patman Act Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 741, 754
(1959).
18,268 (1968);
12 See Marlo Furniture Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8745, 3 TRADE REG. RaP.
18,103 (1967); Creel, PreAll-State Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
Trial Discovery and Motions, 14 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 23 (1959); Auerbach, supra note
11, at 425, 428-9.
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ity granted by sections 6, 9 and 10 of the FTC Act,13 empowering the
Commission to (1) direct a corporation to file annual or special reports
and answer specific questions in writing; (2) obtain access to corporate
files for examining and copying of their contents; and (3) subpoena
the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence. These investigatory powers are enforceable by court order (any
violation being punishable as contempt) or by judicially imposed penal
sanctions.
Most pretrial investigations are conducted in private, so the issue of
public disclosure is postponed. Nevertheless, questions of confidentiality occur frequently at several stages of the investigation process. The
Commission may seek sensitive information from private sources or
other government departments.
The primary purpose in conducting investigations is to develop
evidence to support a subsequent Commission prosecution in a public
hearing, and, with minor exceptions, the information is available to
complaint counsel.' 4 Fearful of possible disclosure, holders of sensitive
data demand ironclad guarantees of appropriate safeguards. But,
although the FTC's power to demand information is frequently challenged and assurances of confidential treatment are often sought, such
challenges seldom succeed and promises of confidentiality are infrequently given.
Public Investigations
The most noteworthy aspect of public pretrial investigations today is
their rarity and seeming insignificance. Nevertheless, the mere prospect of public precomplaint investigations raises significant questions
of confidential treatment, the resolution of which contrasts sharply
with the handling of sensitive data at the hearing level.
While economic inquiries and rulemaking hearings often are public,
precomplaint proceedings normally take place in secrecy comparable
to that of the grand jury room. Although Congress neither authorized
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49, 50 (1964). See generally Withrow, supra note 8; Hill, Investigative
Powers and Techniques of the Federal Trade Commission, 31 J. BAR ASS'N D.C. 193 (1964);
Mueller, Access to CorporatePapers Under the FTC Act, 11 KAN. L. REv. 77 (1962).

FTC investigation procedures vary. They range from fulldress formal hearings before
the entire Commission, see note 17 infra and accompanying text, or an examiner, to
informal inquiries by one FTC attorney-investigator seeking voluntary information without
any suggestion of compulsory process. Between these extremes lie most investigations which
usually are an admixture of compulsory process and cooperation between Commission
counsel and respondent's attorney. See Pollock, supra note 8, at 10-25.
14 See Mississippi River Fuel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8657 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP.
17,321 (1965); Dixon, Recent Changes in Organization and Procedure
of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 ABA ANxrrmusr SaroN 252, 253-4 (1961).
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nor prohibited public investigations, two of the three investigative
tools which it furnished the FTC with do not invite public use.
Requests by the Commission for special reports from a corporation 5
or for access to corporate files' 6 do not suggest that the requested information will be disseminated widely; only the subpoenaed witness/
document procedure follows the pattern of the typical public trial.
For almost fifty years the FTC conducted all pretrial investigations in
private. Then, in late 1961, over the objection of one of its members,
the full Commission held a public investigational hearing to determine
whether a paper company might have violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act in making several acquisitions.' 7 Six officials of the paper company
appeared as directed, but the Commission's reliance on a public hearing was extremely controversial and the results were inconclusive.
A second public investigational hearing was held before a staff
attorney-examiner in March 1962 to examine pricing practices of several grocery chains and local supermarkets for possible RobinsonPatman Act violations during a price war in Indianapolis. Here, the
refusal by one firm to participate, after denial by the Commission of
its motion for either nonpublic hearing or full representation by
counsel,' s was upheld by a district court because of the inadequate
15 Until the Supreme Court's famous dictum in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 652 (1950), which suggested the broad inquisitorial field opened by § 6(b), the
FTC's use of special reports had been limited to general economic inquiries. E.g., FTC v.
Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927); FTC v. Millers' Nat'l Fed'n, 47 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir.
1931); FTC v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1927). Special reports were first
used in a precomplaint investigation less than ten years ago. The use of § 6(b) reports,
however, has not proven an unqualified success since framing questions that will elicit
desired information requires careful drafting and considerable knowledge of the industry
involved. See United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 181 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd and
rev'd in part, 285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
16 Although intended originally as the Commission's most potent investigative weapon,
early restrictive interpretations, e.g., FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924),
even though subsequently overturned [at least sub silentio, see, e.g., 1 K. C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 3.06 (1958)], have resulted in sparing use of the FTC's visitation
powers. Pollock, supra note 8, at 12-14. Moreover, to the extent that the Commission still
is required to particularize its requests, the right of visitation is, in effect, coextensive with
the subpoena power. And this right of access (as with § 6(b) special reports) is enforceable
only by the Attorney General. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964). On the other hand, until a recent
challenge, FTC investigative subpoenas were enforceable by the FTC directly in the district
court. See FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1957); FTC v. Continental Can Co., 267
F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); FTC v. Green, 252 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see FTC
v. Guignon, 5 TaDE REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.) 72,362 (8th Cir. 1968), af'g 261 F. Supp.
215 (D. Mo. 1966).
17 St. Regis Paper Co., FTC File No. 551 0696, reported in BNA ANTrrRuST & TRADE
REG. REP. No. 25, A-9 (Jan. 2, 1962); id. No. 34, A-10 (March 6, 1962). Commissioner Elman
was the objecting member.
18 See FTC Release (Feb. 28, 1962), reported in 3 TRADE RE. Rn'.
10,114.10 (1968);
BNA ANTIrrusT & TRADE REG. Rn'. No. 34, A-10 (March 6, 1962); id. No. 36, A-19 (March
20, 1962).
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representation permitted respondent. 9 Four months later, a similar
ruling thwarted an attempt by the Commission to hold a public hearing
concerning Denver's milk-price wars. 20 Since these ill-fated experiments, all FTC pretrial investigations have been nonpublic.
Perhaps the Commission never will attempt another public precomplaint investigation since its earlier attempts not only were generally unsuccessful, but also were severely criticized, and divided the
Commission. On the other hand, with the 1963 adoption of the socalled Mead rules,21 the FTC expanded the scope of legal representation permitted in public (and nonpublic) investigations, possibly removing this procedural impediment. 22 Moreover, since the FTC's rules
continue to assert the power to hold such hearings,2 3 the questions of
confidentiality they raise cannot safely be ignored.
The Commission has apparently taken the position that the dearth
of public precomplaint investigations excuses it from providing any
guidance as to how confidential material will be judged and treated in
public investigations. 24 Its decisions and rules are silent. A cursory
glance might suggest that the questions of confidential treatment at
public trials and pretrial investigations are identical and that rules for
adjudicative proceedings should apply to both. But closer analysis suggests that each is distinctive, that confidential treatment should be
granted readily in public investigations in contrast to public trials, and,
perhaps, that fairness (if not due process) requires all precomplaint
investigations to be private.
Sensitive data is protected by in camera treatment in adjudicative
hearings only when the proponent of confidential treatment demonstrates that public disclosure would result in "clearly defined, serious
19 Hall v. Lemke, 1962 Trade Cas.
70,338 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
70,417 (N.D. Ill.
1962). This proposed hearing
20 Archer v. Lemke, 1962 Trade Cas.
arguably was informational rather than regulatory. See Note, The Distinction Between
Informing and ProsecutionalInvestigations:A FunctionalJustification for "Star Chamber"
Proceedings,72 YALE LJ. 1227, 1240 n.54 (1963).
21 In Mead Corp., FTC File No. 571 0656 [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE EG. REP.
16,241 (1963), the Commission set forth the limits of participation by a witness's counsel
in FTC investigation proceedings. They were subsequently incorporated into its rules.
FTC Rules § 2.9.
22 But see FTC Release (May 24, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 8460 (1967). Commissioner Elman
dissented from the issuance of Rule § 2.9 as violating the right to counsel guaranteed by
§ 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Compare FTC Rules § 2.9, with APA § 6(a),
5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. I1, 1968), and S.Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 221-43 (1963)
(Administrative Conference recommendation on right to counsel in administrative
proceedings).
23 FTC Rules § 2.8(c).
24 However, the Indianapolis hearings did permit in camera treatment for trade secrets
as well as corporate board and executive committee meeting minutes. See BNA ANTrrRUsr
& TRADE RE. REP. No. 42, A-15 (May 1, 1962); FTC Releases (April 27 & May 3, 1962),
reported in 3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,114.11 (1968).
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injury" to him. 25 The general policy favoring total disclosure at a
public trial is designed to insure the fairness of the trial and to inform
the public. The determination of whether the contested information is
confidential and deserves private treatment, therefore, requires a careful weighing of many factors. These include the need for public disclosure, the type of information involved, the likelihood and quantum
of harm flowing from public disclosure, and the availability of satisfactory alternatives. The need to inform the public tends to weigh
heavy in the balance.
Pretrial investigations, on the other hand, serve a very different function. 26 Their sole objective is the acquisition of information from
which the FTC can determine whether the public interest would be

served by a prosecution of specific companies or individuals. Their
procedures should be tested by the single standard of whether the practice is necessary for a fair determination of probable cause. This standard would seem to preclude pretrial public hearings. Informing the
public of the investigation either to demonstrate the Commission's
activity in the public interest or to alert unknown persons having relevant information does not justify public disclosure of sensitive data.
Press releases announcing complaints, annual reports, speeches, and the
like, can be used to inform the public of the Commission's vigilant
25 See Gellhorn 411-23; Cohn & Zuckman, FCC v. Schreiber: In Camera and the
Administrative Agency, 56 GEO. L.J. 451, 462-4 (1968).
26 For a persuasive analysis of public pre-prosecutorial investigations in the context of
the right to counsel dispute presented by Hall v. Lemke, supra note 19, which reaches
conclusions similar to those suggested here, see 72 YALE LJ. 1227, supra note 20. See also,
e.g., Murchison, Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in FederalAgency Investigational
Hearings, 62 Mscn. L. REv. 485 (1964); Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of Due
Process Requirments in Administrative Investigations-I, II, Ii, 47 MINN. L. Rav. 939
(1963), 48 MINN. L. Rv.557, 1081 (1964); Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 875 (1961); Newman, Federal Agency Investigations:Procedural
Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 MicH. L. REv. 169 (1961); Newman, Due Process,
Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 735 (1961); Note, Representation by
Counsel in Administrative Proceedings,58 COLUm. L. REv. 395 (1958).
Since the focus of the discussion here is on precomplaint investigations, it should be
noted that this analysis is not automatically transferrable to other types of FTC investigations such as those directed solely toward gathering information. The standard for confidential treatment of sensitive data in broad economic inquiries or proposed rule-making
hearings in one sense should correspond more closely to adjudicative hearings because one
purpose common to both is to inform the public. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 293-4
(1965). On the other hand, this is not the only function of such investigations and subpoenaed witnesses are not involved in determining the innocence of themselves or another.
Thus, whatever the propriety of using information investigations in other contexts to
regulate by publicity, see, e.g., Rauh & Pollitt, Right to and Nature of Representation
Before Congressional Committees, 45 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1961), FTC information hearings
require a meticulous balancing of the significance of public disclosure against the potential
injury to the opponent of release, and only when the former outweighs the latter should
disclosure follow. See Cohn & Zuckman, supra note 25, at 462.
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efforts. In the unusual situation where the agency is unaware of who
might have necessary information, any general notice seems adequate.
The propriety of the Commission's decision to prosecute will become
apparent when evidence is presented at trial, and judicial injunctions
are available to prevent the rare case of investigative harassment by an
2T
agency.
This analysis suggests that when an investigated party asserts that
particular information deserves confidential treatment, the request
should be granted unless the proponent of public disclosure demonstrates either a clear need for such disclosure or danger of serious
public harm if the information is not disclosed. In effect, the presumption in favor of public disclosure at adjudicative hearings is reversed to
one of non-disclosure in public pretrial investigations. If determining
the question of confidentiality requires that secret information be examined, this preliminary disclosure must be at a secret hearing or any
subsequent protection would become meaningless. 28 Then, if confidential treatment is warranted, in camera treatment such as that relied
upon to protect sensitive material at the hearing level would appear
appropriate.2 9
Some may object that the suggested procedure effectively undermines the Commission's power to hold pre-prosecution hearings in
public. This criticism misses the mark, however, since the limitation
affects only the treatment of confidential information and leaves un27 See, e.g., Frito-Lay, Inc. v. FTC, 380 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d
861, 866-7 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962); cf. Rettinger v. FTC, 392 F.2d
454, 457-8 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Cohn & Zuckman, supra note 25, at 464-7; Withrow, supra
note 8, at 486; Comment, Procedures to Challenge the Process of Administrative Agencies,
30 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 508 (1963). But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.
71,733 (D.D.C. 1966).
1966); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 1966 Trade Cas.
28 It has been suggested that a secret preliminary hearing procedure should apply to
all determinations of demands for confidential treatment in investigations, whether such
hearings are directed toward subsequent prosecutions, proposed legislation, broad economic
inquiries, or new substantive rules. Cohn & Zuckman, supra note 25, at 459-62. This has
not presented any serious problem in FTC public precomplaint investigations, however,
since the Commission apparently has granted in camera status to sensitive data liberally;
nor has it rejected any requests that this determination be made in secret session. See note
24 supra. However, it does not seem likely that an examiner would need to examine the
confidential data itself to rule on the in camera request in most cases. Nevertheless, the
suggestion that the procedure be institutionalized (and thereby regularized) by incorporating it explicitly in the Commission's rules seems preferable to current ad hoc methods,
where the secrecy of preliminary hearings depends on the predisposition of the examiner.
18,577, at 20,919 n.8 (InterCf. Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755, 3 TMADE REG. REP.
locutory Order, Nov. 1, 1968).
29 If an investigated party is dissatisfied with the Commission's determination, limited
judicial review and protection is then available. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290-1,
296 (1965). But see Note, FCC v. Schreiber-A New Weapon in the Administrative Arsenal?,
20 Sw. L.J. 374, 381-3 (1966).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:113

touched much of the information which may be brought out in an
investigation. For example, if the information sought at the investigation has been previously disclosed by the witness, or if its public disclosure would cause no particular injury, the presumption in favor of
a request for confidentiality could be readily rebutted.
It should be pointed out, however, that the propriety of public prosecution investigatory hearings is very much in question. One need not
adopt the view that the use of pretrial investigation as a publicity
sword turns all information into sensitive or confidential data90 to
feel that the FTC should decide that public pretrial investigations are
inappropriate because of problems of undue disclosure. Though judicial
dicta suggest that public investigations are not unconstitutional,"' the
cases seem distinguishable and the dicta ill-conceived. 32 In any case,
there appears to be no valid reason to support public precomplaint
investigations and several positive reasons to oppose them. In addition
to the objections already stated, there is the overriding concern that such
investigations may generate substantial adverse publicity against the
investigated company. Although the harm to the investigated party's
reputation may be similar to that suffered by a respondent in a public
adjudicative hearing, the safeguards available in FTC trials are absent
in preprosecution investigations. The public character of a trial is designed to keep judge and witness fair and honest; respondent can crossexamine witnesses and present his own case, thus minimizing any harm.
Since pretrial investigations cannot lead to official sanctions, the credibility of witnesses and fairness of an examiner's rulings are not generally subject to challenge. Similarly, an investigated party's right to
counsel is limited-he is not allowed to "interrupt" the proceedings
with questions or to present rebuttal evidence, although the Commis30 Cf. Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 225 (1957).
31 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446 (1960) (ruling on scope of counsel's participation
in Civil Rights Commission investigative hearings; dictum that FTC rules limiting
participation by witness's counsel in investigative proceedings were not constitutionally
defective). Although two justices noted that the CRC was authorized to hold public
hearings (id. at 492, 496), it is not clear from the opinions in Hannah whether a public
hearing was there contemplated (but an affidavit filed by CRC's general counsel in Hall
v. Lemke, supra note 19, indicates that it was). 72 YALE L.J. 1227, note 20 supra. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion, however, stressed the statutory protections (including
a requirement of executive session) where public disclosure could be harmful to an
individual. 863 U.S. at 490-2. Moreover, the court's discussion of the FTC analogue does
not indicate any judicial awareness of public precomplaint investigations by the FTC.
See id. at 446, 456-9. And, of course, all such proceedings had been held in secrecy before
that date.
32 See Withrow, supra note 8, at 474-5; Pollock, supra note 8, at 25; 72 YALE L.J. 1227,
1282-42, note 20 supra. But see Dixon, The Federal Trade Commission: Its Fact-Finding
Responsibilities and Powers, 46 MAuq. L. REv. 17, 27-28 (1962).
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sion usually will accept subsequent clarifications and explanatory
memoranda. 33 While the public interest in disclosure weighs heavy
after it has been found that probable cause exists, no such counterbalance is present during precomplaint proceedings.
Acquiring ConfidentialInformation

Since pretrial investigations today are held in secret session with
neither public notice nor subsequent disclosure, the balance of this
discussion of the treatment of confidential information at the investigative stage concentrates on closed rather than open investigation.
Acquisition of information by the Commission in such surroundings,
at least initially, would not appear to raise any questions of confidential treatment. The party compelled to submit data (or one who does so
voluntarily) need not claim confidential treatment; nonpublic treatment is accorded automatically. 4 However, this does not mean that
such witnesses do or should make sensitive data freely available without
giving notice of its confidential character or need for secret handling.
Confidential treatment at the precomplaint stage may be no assurance
of limited circulation as the investigative process becomes adjudicative.
In fact, the objective of the precomplaint investigation is to obtain
evidence for use by the FTC during the public hearing.
Thus, questions of confidentiality at this stage may involve assertions
that the FTC is not entitled to the information or that it should be
disclosed to the Commission only under the most stringent judicial
supervision with continuing secrecy assured by the threat of contempt
hanging over any unauthorized disclosure.3 5 In contrast to the discovery
stage, where both the respondent and the Commission will at various
times seek disclosure of information, the desire for disclosure is onesided during the investigatory phase. Only the FTC can initiate an
investigation or request information; investigated parties or other informants are bystanders and may not participate in the investigatory
process. 36 Since the investigator generally has access to FTC files, the
33 See FTC Rules § 2.9(b)(5); cf. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8657 (Initial
Decision Jan. 29, 1968).
34 Section 10 of the FTC Act applies criminal penalties to disclosure of any information in FTC files unless such disclosure is authorized by the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 50
(1964). Section 6(f) further admonishes the FTC not to publish trade secrets. 15 U.S.C. § 46(f)
(1964). These provisions are reinforced by Commission rules. FTC Rules §§ 4.10(a)(2) &
(6), 4.10(d).
35 See, e.g., FTC v. Green, 252 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); FTC v. Nat'l Biscuit Co.,
18 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); cf. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
36 The wording of the statute and its legislative history lead us to the conclusion
that the exercise of the procedure outlined in 6(b) was reserved exclusively to the
F.T.C. in its function as protector of the public interest. There is no indication
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sources he will mine for information are either private firms and individuals or other government agencies.
From Private Sources. The congressional authorization of the Commission's investigatory power is not conditioned in any way on the
nature of the information sought or the uses to which it may be put.3 7
(Only the general limitations on unauthorized disclosure of the contents of FTC files apply.) Nevertheless, holders of information which
fits within current doctrines of testimonial privilege apparently can
assert that such information need not be disclosed.
Despite congressional silence and the lack of guidance from FTC
rules, required disclosure of information within the attorney-client and
work product privileges is probably not within the Commission's investigatory prerogatives.38 The Commission has recognized the attorneyclient doctrine in rejecting respondent's attempts to discover complaint
counsel's case,3 9 and, while the precomplaint investigatory phase is
distinguishable and the privilege arguably is inapplicable since no
action has been (or may ever be) brought against the informant, recent
expansions of the right to counsel support the view that this privilege is
of cardinal importance at the investigative level and should not be
impaired without overriding cause. 40 Analogous grand jury proceedings
41
likewise recognize the privilege.
A similar analysis requires recognition of the work product privilege
in Commission investigations. Although the issue has never been
decided by the Commission, by analogy again to FTC discovery prothat this extraordinary power was ever meant to be utilized by a private party to
an enforcement proceeding.
Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v. FTC, 233 F. Supp. 660, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
37 Enforcement, however, is conditioned on meeting the requirements of §§ 6, 9, and
10 of the FTC Act and of proper authorization, relevance, and reasonableness. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 46, 49, 50 (1964); see Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
It should be noted that the various testimonial privileges not examined are inapplicable
to FTC proceedings. See Gellhorn 406.
38 This conclusion is stated categorically by a prominent FTC practitioner, but without
citation of direct authority. F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 486 (1962).
39 E.g., Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [ 19 65-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REC. REP.
17,467 (1966); accord, CAB v. Air Transport Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C.
1961).
40 See note 21 and authorities cited notes 22 & 26 supra; cf., e.g., United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v.
Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1967).
41 See Continental Oil Co. V. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964). See generally
Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DuxE L.J. 97. See also
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-3 (1950) (analogizing FTC investigative
powers to functions of the grand jury). There may be limits, however, to the grand jury
analogue. See Note, The Distinction Between Informing and ProsecutorialInvestigations:
A FunctionalJustification for "Star Chamber" Proceedings,72 YALE L.J. 1227, 1236-7 (1963).
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ceedings where the privilege now is generally recognized, 42 it seems
clear that the FTC will honor the work product privilege during its investigations. 43 On the other hand, both the FTC and the courts will
reject any attempt to assert a claim of accountant-client privilege not
recognized at common law. 44 While the leading decision can be questioned on other grounds, 45 the denial of this privilege in FTC investigations seem proper since no persuasive case has yet been made for the
46
protection of this relationship.
When compelled, a witness cannot avoid disclosure of trade secrets
or of other confidential information to an FTC investigator. The one
exception involves retained copies of confidential census reports which
Congress has ruled are immune from FTC scrutiny.4 7 Some have
argued that section 6(f) of the FTC Act, which prohibits the Commission's publication of trade secrets, restricts the agency's right to demand
such information in an investigation; but such arguments have rightfully failed. 48 Contentions that Commission requests for sensitive data
42 E.g., R. H. Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1965); Koppers Co., FTC
Dkt. No. 8755 (Interlocutory Order Aug. 14, 1968); id. (Interlocutory Order July 2, 1968);
Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,467, at 22,752 (1966); Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,409 (1965); Bakers Franchise Corp., 56 F.T.C. 1636, 1637
(1959).
43 The vital importance of preserving inviolate the work product of attorneys so
eloquently detailed by the Supreme Court in its opinion in Hickman v. Taylor
applies with even greater force to the investigatory work of Government attorneys
who are engaged not only in the representation of their client, but in the protection of the public interest.
L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8624 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,532, at 22,799-800 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
44 FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962); accord, Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
45 See Gellhorn 407 nn.35-6; Withrow, supra note 8, at 483.
46 See 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961); C. McCoRMICK, EVIDEN E
§ 81 (1954); Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-Accountant and Client, 46
N.C.L. REv. 419, 423-7 (1968).
47 In its first use of § 6(b) reports in a precomplaint investigation, the FTC sought to
compel respondent to disclose retained copies of confidential reports which it had submitted to the Census Bureau. Despite the statement on the Census Bureau's report form
that the "report is confidential" and could not be "used for purposes of taxation, investigation or regulation," the Supreme Court held that retained copies in a private party's files
could be demanded by the FTC since the Act did not expressly prohibit such demands. St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). The Commission triumph became
a pyrrhic victory, however, when Congress nullified the decision by providing that retained
copies of census reports were "immune from legal process" and could not be used
involuntarily against the respondent in any "judicial or administrative proceeding." 13
U.S.C. § 9(a) (1964); see 87th Cong., 2d Sess., House, Comm. on Post Office & Civil Service,
Hearings on Confidentiality of Census Reports 7-9 (1962).
48 E.g., FTC v. Cooper, 1962 Trade Cas.
70,353 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); FTC v. Tuttle, 244
F.2d 605, 616 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957); FTC v. Waltham Watch Co., 169
F. Supp. 614, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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should be subject to stringent court orders insuring confidential treatment have generally been more successful. 49 In the past, courts have
commonly conditioned enforcement of administrative subpoenas upon
an agency's compliance with such protective orders. 50 But since the
Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Schreiber51 that a protective order
is premature until the subpoenaed information is made available to the
agency and the agency has had an opportunity to rule upon respondent's request for confidential treatment, such restrictions no longer
should be imposed by court enforcement of FTC investigative requests. 52 On the other hand, voluntary submission to the Commission
of sensitive data, contingent upon confidential treatment, may be
viewed by the Commission as making it honor-bound to observe that
commitment.58
From Government Sources. Private parties are not the only source of
data useful in FTC prosecutions. As the government has become the
largest single depository of business information, 54 the Commission's
ability to acquire information from files of other government agencies
would seem increasingly important.
Cooperation between the FTC and other government departments
49 In FTC v. Menzies, 145 F. Supp. 164, 171 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 81, 84 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957), the court's restrictive order provided:
No part of the documentary evidence should be made public and available to
the competitors of the several respondent corporations unless it is necessary to do
so in the proper enforcement of the law. If requested by the respondents, the Commission should follow its practice of placing the documents offered in evidence
in a confidential file....
But see FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'g, 170 F. Supp. 24 (N.D.
Ill. 1958).
50 E.g., FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
51 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
52 FTC v. Green, 252 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. United States v. Assoc. Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d
487 (8th Cir. 1966); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 1966 Trade Cas. 71,733 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
FTC v. Continental Can Co., 267 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
53 For example, in denying discovery of information from its investigative file to a
respondent in an adjudicative proceeding, the FTC commonly argues, as it did in Sperry
9- Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE RZc. REP.
17,505, at 22,779 (1966), that:
The persons and businesses who supply the kind of information concerned are
frequently reluctant to have their affairs made public and they expect, in
providing this information to the Commission, that its confidentiality will be
maintained wherever possible.
See also H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1184, 1190 (1961).
54 H. R. REP. No. 52, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-54 (1965); see Ikard, The Scope, Volume
and Expense Involved in Furnishing Requested Information, ABA MINERAL & NATURAL
REsouRcEs LAW SECaION 4 (1965). See generally Hoffman, Industry Reports to GovernmentSome Legal Problems,ABA MINERAL & NATURAL REsOURCEs LAW SECTION 8 (1965); Bowman,
The Role of the Bureau of the Budget, ABA MINERAL & NATURAL RESOURcEs LAW SECTION
25 (1965), both reprinted in 18 AD. L. REv. 80 & 109 (Fall, 1966).
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takes many forms, including liaison with the Justice Department to
coordinate antitrust enforcement. 55 Formal arrangements or agreements have been entered into by the FTC with the Food and Drug
Administration,5 6 the Federal Communications Commission,57 and the
Bureau of Customs58 to avoid unnecessary overlapping and duplication
of effort. The FTC also has informal arrangements with the Bureau of
Standards, the Post Office Department, and the Patent Office. 59 More
significant on the surface in terms of Commission power to obtain
information in a precomplaint investigation is the provision of section
8 of the FTC Act that all federal departments are obliged to furnish,
at the Commission's request, any papers or information in their files on
any corporation subject to the FTC's jurisdiction. 0 However, this provision is effective only when the President directs that other government
agencies cooperate with the Commission, and as yet no executive order
has been issued under this authority. This provision apparently has
been permitted to lie dormant because the Commission can require
private parties to produce information even though that information
55 Memorandum of Agreement between FTC and Justice Department, (1948), reprinted
in part in REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws 374-7 (1955). See also FTC Rules § 4.6; Rockefeller, Antitrust Enforcement: Duopoly or Monopoly, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 437.
The Commission's recent refusal to disclose the details of this liaison arrangement to the
author illustrates the FTC's penchant for secrecy and misuse of confidentiality labels. This
two page agreement, drafted by Commissioner MacIntyre when he was an FTC staff
member, merely details the establishment of a duplicate card filing system, recording
matters under investigation by each agency. Nevertheless, when a request for a copy of
this agreement was made to the FTC's general counsel, disclosure was refused because
the agreement "is in the Confidential files of the Commission, and, for that reason, we are
unable to furnish you with a copy of it." Letter from James McI. Henderson, FTC General
Counsel, to Ernest Gellhorn, July 9, 1968. In contrast, a similar request to the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department resulted
in a routine release of the memorandum agreement. Letter and enclosure from Robert A.
Hammond, III, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Ernest Gellhorn,
July 25, 1968. This practice is another illustration of the Commission's blind reliance on
the location rather than the contents of a document to determine its confidentiality. See
note 175 infra and accompanying text.
56 FTC Release (June 9, 1954); id. (Jan. 23, 1968). See also Charles Pfizer & Co., FTC
17,102 (1964).
Dkt. No. 7780 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
57 22 Fed. Reg. 2318 (1957).
58 FTC Release (Jan. 24, 1956).
59 1954 FTC ANN. REP. 9; Letter from James McI. Henderson, General Counsel, FTC,
to Ernest Gellhorn, July 8, 1968; see Address by Frank C. Hale, Acting Director, FTC

Bureau of Deceptive Practices, to Conference of Postal Inspectors, Washington, D.C.,
March 13, 1968.
60 15 U.S.C § 48 (1964). Compliance with § 8 avoids the general prohibition (in 1$ U.S.C.
§ 1905 (1964); 44 id. § 4) of disclosures of trade secrets or confidential information by federal
employees except as authorized by law.
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is already in another government agency's files.61 Moreover, since 1947
the FTC has been authorized under the Internal Revenue Code to
inspect corporate income tax returns; 62 no problem of confidentiality
will develop under this authority because confidentiality must be maintained by the FTC except for statistical tabulations which do not
identify any taxpayer. 3 Finally, there is some information which cannot be disclosed to the FTC. Compulsory returns filed with the Census
Bureau are in this category; in contrast with the former rule regarding
retained copies in private files, they always have been confidential and
cannot be disclosed for regulatory purposes.6 4
Formal FTC reliance on its power to acquire information from other
government departments, then, somewhat parallels the early record of
the FTC's use of its investigatory powers to compel information from
private sources. That is, despite extensive formal powers, the Commission does not appear to have relied upon them, depending instead on
informal cooperation. Whether the past decade's experience with more
extensive formal investigatory demands on private parties will be
repeated in the Commission's search for prosecutorial information in
the files of other government agencies seems doubtful, however. Despite
government's expanding role as an information bank, most data useful
in FTC prosecutions is probably only in private hands. Moreover,
political realities of agency operation undoubtedly will continue to
discourage many formal requests.6 5
Nonetheless, since one purpose of FTC precomplaint investigations
is to gather information to be produced at a later public hearing, disturbing questions of confidentiality could arise. When one government
agency makes available to the FTC information considered by a private
source to be "confidential," should the disclosing agency or the FTC
reveal that fact to the private source? Or, would it be preferable to
allow the other agency to protect its private sources by conditioning
disclosure on continued confidential treatment despite possible conflict with FTC policy on confidentiality in adjudicative hearings?46
61 See FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739, 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 882 (1960);
General Trade Schools v. United States, 212 F.2d 656, 661 (8th Cir. 1954).
62 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6103(a); see Exec. Order No. 10,908, 3 C.F.R., 19591963 Comp. 437 (1961); Exec. Order No. 10,544, 3 C.F.R., 1954-1958 Comp. 198-9 (1954);
Exec. Order No. 10,090, 3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp. 286-7 (1949); Exec. Order No. 9833, 3
C.F.R., 1943-1948 Comp. 626 (1947).
63 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-106(a) (1961).
64 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1964). For another example of such a prohibition, see an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 320(f) (1964).
65 Cf. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 217 (1961).
66 This alternative is similar to the proposal of Cohn & Zuckman, supra note 25, at
472, that the informing agency "request that the confidentiality of the material be re-
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(The latter issue also occurs when the confidential information was
developed by the disclosing agency.) Without attempting a thorough
examination of these problems in the abstract, fairness suggests a notice
standard as a minimum. Just as the FTC will disclose the purpose of
the investigation to an investigated party or informant, 7 so the FTC
or the informing government agency should notify the private source
that information he supplied is being disclosed to the FTC. The
private party, in turn, should be given an opportunity to request
continued confidential treatment or to appear before the FTC to
explain why public disclosure would be inappropriate.
Disclosing ConfidentialInformation
Adhering to the practices of all prosecuting agencies, FTC investigative files are treated as confidential and will not be made public at
the precomplaint stage. 8 Confidentiality serves several purposes with
which disclosure might interfere. First, it protects innocent investigated
parties. An investigation is designed only to determine whether probable cause exists and whether a prosecution is in the public interest.69
Often, although one or both is not satisfactorily demonstrated and no
complaint is issued, a disclosure of FTC files would reveal material
harmful to such "cleared" parties. Release of investigatory material
could also improperly harm those against whom a complaint is actually
brought. Generally, complaint investigations concentrate on gathering
inculpatory information; disclosure of investigatory files would not be
likely to reveal an equal quantity of exculpatory material. The respondent has not yet had an opportunity to present his case; probable
cause is not the equivalent of guilt. And even if respondent is later
determined to be a law violator, disclosure seems improper because
investigatory files are not "balanced" and would not contain counterbalancing or mitigating evidence.
Disclosure of investigatory files might also interfere with the Commission's prosecutorial mission. Complaint counsel's case would be
revealed prematurely. Consent negotiations may still be possible; prosecution may be more difficult if investigatory files were opened except
spected." Since their article concentrates on preliminary in camera hearings, however, they

did not consider other alternatives or explain their choice.
67 FTC Rules § 2.6.
68 FTC Rules § 4.10(a)(6). See also id. §§ 2.2(d), 4.10(a)(2). But the investigational witness
generally is allowed to obtain a transcript of his testimony. Id. § 2.9(a); see 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)
(Supp. III, 1968).
69 The "public interest" limitation on FTC complaints, however, applies only to
prosecutions brought under § 5 of the FTC Act. See Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d
268, 269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940). See generally French, The Federal
Trade Commission and the Public Interest, 49 MINN. L. Rxv 539 (1965).
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under controlled discovery; and investigatory files may contain irrelevant (and harmful) materials or the nondiscoverable work product of
the investigator. Further disclosure, would reveal the identity of complainants upon whom the Commission relies so heavily; this "informer's privilege" protects a complainant against economic or other
harassment. Thus, there seems little reason to doubt the appropriateness
of the general rule that investigative files are secret.70 The rules prohibiting disclosure are not likely to be abandoned. They have long
been followed by prosecuting agencies, are often required by statute,
and are frequently recognized by the courts. Most judicial contests
have concerned attempts to prevent disclosure, not to compel it.71
Nor does the recent amendment to section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act affect FTC investigatory policy.7 2 Despite considerable
doubt as to the type and scope of confidential information excluded
from its broad disclosure command, 73 the Freedom of Information Act
is relatively clear in exempting all precomplaint investigative files from
74
its reach.
Nevertheless, at least two problems may occur. The first, illustrated by a celebrated case, involves the direct leak of information
from the Commission's investigative files by one of its personnel. In
1954 the Commission's chairman divulged the name of a private complainant (whose information had instigated an FTC investigation) to a
presidential assistant who passed it on to the investigated business77
man.75 Strict statutory prohibitions and penalties, 76 Commission rules,
78
more cautious Commission personnel, and the notoriety of the Gold70 However, once a complaint is issued, a respondent may be entitled to materials from
the investigative files in order to discover Commission counsel's case or to locate exculpatory
material, but disclosure then is governed by principles of discovery and is considered in
that context.
71 See I K. C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 3.13 (1958).
72 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1968). See also Note, The Federal Freedom of Information
Act as an Aid to Discovery, 54 IowA L. REv. 141, 152 n.73 (1968) (collecting authorities).
73 Compare Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of
the Administrative Procedure Act 32-34 (1967), with Davis, The Information Act: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 787-92 (1967).
74 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. III, 1968); see Davis, supra note 73, at 799-800.
75 The reference, of course, is to one of the indiscretions which cost President Eisenhower's assistant Sherman Adams his job. He secured the name of the private party from
FTC Chairman Howrey and revealed it to Bernard Goldfine. H.R. REP. No. 2711, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46-50 (1959).
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(f), 50 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964); 44 U.S.C. § 423(b) (Supp. III,
i968).
The FTC has also relied on § 5 of the FTC Act to prevent the use of confidential intraagency documents for private advertising purposes. Ro-Ed Engineering & Combustion Co.,
28 F.T.C. 1787 (1939).
77 See note 68 supra.
78 Cf., e.g., Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,946, at
20,643-4 (1968).
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fine affair have maintained the integrity of FTC files since then (although the first two were in force in 1954).
The second problem concerns the demand of private litigants in
judicial actions for information in the Commission's investigative files.
Various aspects of the doctrine of executive privilege have been asserted
by administrative agencies to protect their investigative files from civil
process (even against in camera disclosure), and these assertions usually
have been successful. 79 In fact, the complaint of most commentators is
that agencies have been too protective and courts too submissive.8 0
Serious problems do not appear to have been raised by demands of
private litigants for FTC information. However, private actions are
available under some of the acts enforced by the Commission and such
demands by private litigants are foreseeable. In this connection, it
should be noted that, in opposing compulsory disclosure of investigative files, administrative agencies have concerned themselves only with
maintaining the secrecy of their files; no attention has had to be paid
specifically to the informant's interests. But if court intervention should
become more bold and agency assertions of confidentiality are questioned, then it would seem appropriate for an agency to notify the
party who supplied the information in order that he might have an
opportunity to object and present his views.
COMPLAINTS

Precomplaint investigations end with the decision either to issue a
complaint or not to prefer charges. The decision to close the investigatory file without a complaint is not made public and is treated as confidential information. 81 This procedure, unchallenged except in discovery attempts by disgruntled competitors whose practices were not
viewed so favorably by the FTC (and possibly unchallengeable even
under the new section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act), seems
appropriate. First, by not issuing a complaint the Commission has not
"cleared respondent of any wrongdoing," but has only determined that
it would not be in the public interest to bring a complaint now. This
decision may be based on the insignificance of the asserted violation,
79 See, e.g., Appeal of the SEG, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955); Timbers & Cohen, Demands
of Litigants for Government Information, 18 U. Prrr. L. RPv. 687 (1957); Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in JudicialProceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 181-4 (1958).
80 See, e.g., Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879, 898-905

(1962).
81 See FTC Rules §§ 4.9, 4.10(a)(6); cf. Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission:
Internal Organization and Procedure,48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 431 (1964): "[F]airness to the

respondent dictates that he should not be subjected to the unfavorable publicity that
attends the issuance of a formal complaint against him unless the enforcement bureau's
investigation has gone far enough to convince it that a violation of law has been committed."
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the lack of supporting evidence, or the need for regional or industrywide rather than individual action. Second, release of the decision not
to proceed could be damaging to respondent because it suggests that
the agency at one time doubted the propriety of the firm's actions.
"Where much has been said, something will be believed ....
Public confusion, noted so often by the Commission in other circumstances (for example, in false advertising cases), may occur; a decision
not to proceed might be misunderstood as a decision to prosecute or
even as a finding of guilt. Finally, the interest in informing the public
of the Commission's activities can be satisfied adequately by general
rather than specific announcements-the individual respondent need
not be named.
Issuance of a complaint by the FTC, on the other hand, is public
information. 3 This practice, traditionally adhered to by administrative
agencies, has been approved by the courts and seems unexceptionable.
One court recently concluded that section 6(f) of the FTC Act broadly
confers this discretion on the agency.8 4 Earlier, another court relied on
the FTC's authority to adopt rules not inconsistent with the Act as
supporting public pleadings and hearings. 5 It pointed out that the
FTC has discretion under the Act to allow third persons to intervene
in adjudicative hearings; 86 unless the complaint and hearing is public
to apprise potential intervenors of the proceeding, the right of intervention becomes meaningless.
The most serious challenge, however, has been to the Commission's
practice, adopted in 1918,87 of simultaneously issuing a press release

with each complaint. Press releases now are issued by the FTC at four
steps in every litigated proceeding-upon issuing the FTC's complaint,
filing respondent's answer (unless it asks that no release be issued),
releasing the examiner's initial decision, and handing down the FTC's
final order. Copies are mailed to 900 publications and overall distribution is around 2,500.88 Except for occasional pressure by consumer
82 Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 348, 348-9, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (1788).

83 FTC Rules § 4.9(e)(3).
84 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade
Cas.) 72,385, at 85,145 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
85 E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1933); FTC Act § 6(g),
15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964).
86 FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
87 Compare FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. RE'.
(1968 Trade Cas.)
72,385, at 85,142 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1968), with T. BLAISDELL, TnE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 83, 85-6 (1932), and 1925 FTC ANN. REI. 23. See S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 135-6 (1941).
88 BNA ANTrnusRT & TRADE RaG. REP. No. 350, B-I (March 26, 1968).
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groups,89 the real contest here has been to prevent rather than procure
publicity for FTC actions. Conceding that pleadings constitute a
public record available to all, the question is whether the Commission
may attract public attention to the record by focusing the press's attention on that information. Though an appellate court has recently up91
held the practice, 0 there is some pressure in Congress to restrict it.
In introducing legislation which would require that all federal administrative agencies give respondents an equal opportunity to respond
when a complaint is issued, one Congressman recently commented that
"the [subsequent] finding of innocence rarely catches up to the pub9' 2
licity of the accusations."
The issue of an agency's release of disparaging publicity before a
final adjudication on the merits, though not strictly a problem of
confidentiality inasmuch as the complaint is already public, bears a
close resemblance to it. At least two questions are involved: Does the
FTC have authority to issue such press releases? Should the Commission publicize complaints-or be required to grant "equal time"93
whether or not so authorized?
Authority to Issue Press Releases
The charge against the Commission is not that press releases are
being used in a discriminatory fashion or that they misstate the terms
of the pleading, but rather that such publicity is ultra vires and should
be enjoined.94 Respondents assert that this ordeal by press release is
89 See, e.g., 32 CONSUMER'S REPors 618 (1967); 33 id. 308 (1968). But see Wall Street
Journal, April 10, 1968, at 18.
90 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade
Cas.) 72,385 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
91 S. 518 & 924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). H.R. 6163, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Similar
proposals, however, have been before Congress before; their history can be traced to at
least the minority report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1941); see Note, DisparagingPublicity by
FederalAgencies, 67 COLum. L. REv. 1512, 1513 n. 4 (1967).
02 Extension of Remarks of Rep. Herbert Tenzer, 113 CONG. R c. A2291 (daily ed. May
9, 1967); see J. LANDIs, THE ADnIINISTRATIVE PROCESS 110 (1938); cf. Respublica v. Oswald,
1 U.S. 343, 348-9, 1 Dall. 319, 324 (1788): "[Mlany will read the charge, who may never see
the answer ... "
93 For a collection of authorities and a general discussion concentrating primarily on
the authority of administrative agencies to issue disparaging publicity when instituting
adjudicatory proceedings, see Note, DisparagingPublicity by FederalAgencies, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 1512 (1967). See also Lemov, Administrative Agency News Releases: Public Information Versus Private Injury, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 63 (1968) proposing that agencies
be granted specific authority to issue certain press releases if simultaneous reply is
allowed and suggesting amendment of the Federal Tort Claims Act to allow monetary
damages.
94 E.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Shools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. R P. (1968
72,385, at 85,146 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Discriminatory or inaccurate press
Trade Case.)
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neither expressly nor impliedly authorized by Congress and that in
issuing the release the agency has prejudged the case in violation of
constitutional standards of due process.
Both arguments were rejected recently in FTC v. Cinderella Career
& FinishingSchools, Inc.,95 where the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit overturned a district judge's prohibition of
"factual news release[s] concerning pending adjudicatory proceedings"
brought under section 5 of the FTC Act. Not doubting that the press
release would cause irreparable injury and if unauthorized would
entitle respondent to an injunction, the court found ample authority
for this Commission practice. Under section 5 the Commission is
charged with eliminating unfair and deceptive business practices; 90 the
basic purpose of the Act is to protect the public. In addition, section
6(f) specifically authorizes release of information as the FTC deems
expedient in the public interest.97 Relying on this statutory structure,
the court concluded that
the Commission, acting in the public interest, [has authority]
to alert the public to suspected violations of the law by factual
press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to
believe that a respondent is engaged in activities made unlawful by the Act which have resulted in the initiation of
action by the Commission. The press releases predicated upon
official action of the Commission constitute a warning or caution to the public, the welfare of which the Commission is in
98
these matters charged.

Congressional awareness and acquiescence in this practice was relied
upon for additional support.
One judge, while concurring in the court's conclusion that press
releases were authorized here, objected to this wholesale approval of
all FTC press releases, at least in section 5 cases. He observed, first, that
releases would seem to present an easier case. See B. C. Morton Int'l Corp. v. FDIC, 205
F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1962).
72,385 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'g, 1967 Trade Cas.
95 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
72,072 (D.D.C. 1967).
96 FTC Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964): "Unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
97 The commission shall also have power(f) To make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained
by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall deem
expedient in the public interest; and to make annual and special reports to the
Congress and to submit therewith recommendations for additional legislation;
and to provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such form and
manner as may be best adapted for public information and use.
FTC Act § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. 46(f) (1964) (emphasis added).
17,385, at 85,145-6 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
98 5 TRADE RaG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
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the court's analysis does not square with the Commission's justification.
The FTC justified the press release not as a warning to the public but
rather as part of its public information function. 9 (And in passing on
the Commission's action, the court is confined to reviewing the grounds
invoked by the Commission.) 10 0 Looking to that justification, Congress's authorization to the FTC to convey information was limited (in
addition to not divulging trade secrets and customer names) to such
information "as it shall deem expedient in the public interest."' 01 This
Judge Robinson reads as imposing two preconditions to disclosing
information: "The first is a judicious exercise of administrative discretion preceding a resolve to publish, ... [and the second] is expedience of the disclosure in the public interest."' 0 2 Nor does it follow
automatically that an informational news release is proper in all false
advertising cases.
[B]oth the discretional function and the Commission's determination in terms of the public interest clearly require adequate consideration and suitable weighing of any damage to
private property which widespread publicity
of unadjudicated
10 3
charges may be calculated to produce.

Although the record did not clearly disclose that the Commission exercised its discretion only after making this determination, it also did not
indicate that the FTC had abused its authority; from the record it
appeared that the FTC could have concluded that the public interest
would be served in this case by pursuing its standard news release
policy.

04

99 The Commission's explanation, as quoted in the concurring opinion, was:
Since complaints fall within the category of public information, the objective of
the Commission's Office of Information, in issuing factual news releases, is to
provide a means whereby such public information is made available, simultaneously, and on an orderly basis, to the bar, industry members, the press, and
interested members of the public.
5 TRADE REa. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
17,385, at 85,148 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also S. Doc.
No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 n.38 (1940): "This practice [of issuing a press release
upon service of the complaint] is said to serve two purposes: (1) To insure a correct
statement of the Commission's action, and (2) to provide equal treatment for all newspapers and press services."
100 FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250, 252 n.5 (1967); see American
Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 364 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1960); Unemployment Compensation
v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
101 See supra note 97.
102 5 TRADE REG. RaP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
72,385, at 85,150 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
103 Id. at 85,151.
104 Except for constitutional questions, the court's review was limited to determining
whether the issuance of a press release was within the FTC's delegated powers, and, if
within the Commission's powers, whether the FTC's discretion was abused or applied
arbitrarily. E.g., Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 414 (1958); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
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The second claim-of agency prejudgment of respondent's case
against him-was disposed of more easily. No court has accepted the
argument that a press release describing an agency's complaint presents
an insurmountable obstacle to a fair, objective hearing and judgment.10 5 Moreover, in the FTC, among the several "judges" of respondent's case, only the chairman, who merely checks the press release
for factual accuracy, ever sees it before it is released; the release itself
is descriptive rather than interpretive, adhering closely to the actual
wording of the complaint. As both courts and commentators have
pointed out, the due process objection is actually a misdirected attack
on the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the
FTC-a joinder sustained by a long line of judicial decisions. 1°6
In addition, the court could have argued that the FTC has implied
authority to issue press releases because of the nature and responsibility
of the agency. 107 That is, where the agency is charged with preventing
public deception by unfair commercial conduct, it has implied power
to notify the public and warn them of those most likely to be using
such prohibited practices. As the Supreme Court declared in another
context: "It would be an unduly restrictive view of the scope of the
duties of a policy-making executive official to hold that a public statement of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest and
concern is not action in the line of duty."' 0 8 On the other hand, this
suggested rationale does not go beyond justifying FTC pretrial press
releases in those cases where substantial public harm is likely without
the warning; it is not support for the present policy of issuing releases
in all cases. 10 9
Despite the array of judicial authority upholding agency power to
issue pretrial press releases, many of the arguments supporting such
105 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. Rt (1968 Trade
Cas.)
72,385, at 85,146-7 (D.C. Cir. 1968); See Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349, 356 (Ist
Cir. 1962); 2 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.10, at 238 (1958).
106 See generally Note, DisparagingPublicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLuM. L. Rav.
1512, 1513-4 (1967).
107 Id. at 1521.
108 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (Harlan, J., announcing judgment in an
opinion signed by four Justices) (defamation action against public official for libelous press
release). The gist of this position was summarized by Mr. Justice Black in the same case:
"The effective functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on the force
of an informed public opinion." 360 U.S. at 577. This rationale was the justification given
respondent by the FTC in Cinderella. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. See also
FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. RaP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
72,385, at 85,148-9 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion); H. CROSS, THE PEoPLE's RIGHT
TO KNOW 197-247 (1953).
109 See REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 136 (1941).
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authority for the FTC seem weak and questionable. First, by its explicit language, section 6(f) of the FTC Actlo obviously is directed
either toward public disclosure of information in the Commission's
files (not publicity for them) or to publicizing final adjudicative decisions or periodic reports about general industry practices. Second,
Congress has made dear, in other contexts, how and when it will
authorize pretrial press releases. The leading example is the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act's authorization to the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (who acts through the FDA) to "cause
to be disseminated information regarding food, drugs, devices, or
cosmetics in situations involving, in the opinion of the Secretary, imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer."1'11 Third,
Congress already has granted similar power to the FTC to prevent
continued public harm during the pendency of agency hearings where
such harm is likely. Specifically, the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment
to the FTC Act authorizes a district court to grant temporary injunctions against the dissemination of false advertisements of foods, drugs,
cosmetics, and devices pending a final order."2 Here it makes sense
to find implied if not explicit authority in the FTC to make such
orders fully effective by widely disseminated news releases. Fourth,
despite numerous appeals by the FTC and consumer groups, Congress
has so far refused to extend such injunctive powers to other FTC
prosecutions." 3 In light of this history, congressional silence does not
justify the Cinderella court's conclusion that Congress has acquiesced
110 See note 97 supra.
111 21 U.S.C. § 375(b) (1964); see United States v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp. of America, 262
F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1967). See also National Comm'n on Product Safety Act, P.L. 90-146,
§ 3(e)(1) & (2), 81 Stat. 466 (1967).
112 FTC Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1964); see FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d
Cir. 1963). The anomaly is that this power has been used sparingly. Between 1938 and
1960 the Commission sought temporary injunctions in only 42 cases; it was granted in all
but three. Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Advertising, 16 Bus. LAw. 81, 88 (1960). Nor has the Commission's reliance on its preliminary injunctive power increased since 1960. See Weston, Deceptive Advertising and
the FTC, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 552 (1964).
The FTC has similar authority to seek preliminary injunctions of violations of the
various labeling acts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68e(b), 69g(b), 70f (1964); 15 U.S.C. § 1195 (1964).
113 E.g., S.3065, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 15339, 15354, 15508, 16156, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968) (Administration bills for a Deceptive Sales Act of 1968); see 114 CoNe. RE.
S941 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1968) (President Johnson's Consumer Protection Message). However,
after deleting authority allowing the FTC to seek temporary restraining orders, S. 3065
was passed by the Senate and would amend § 13 of the FTC Act to authorize preliminary
injunctions in consumer fraud cases. 114 CONG. Rae. S8502 (daily ed. July 11, 1968). Earlier
attempts often sought FTC authority to issue temporary cease and desist orders enforceable
in the courts of appeal. See Pewett, Developments in FederalAntitrust Legislation, 28 ABA
ANTrnausT SECnON 194, 200 (1965); F. RowE, PRicE DIsCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSONPATMAN Aar § 16.13 (1962, Supp. 1964).
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in the FTC's practice of issuing pretrial press releases. 114 Fifth, even
if one accepts the view that some press releases are authorized, the
arguments justifying this conclusion generally would not support the
present Commission practice of issuing releases on all FTC complaints.
The Exercise of Discretion
Even if the FTC does have authority to issue press releases upon
filing the complaint, as is the apparent judicial conclusion, it does not
follow that it necessarily should continue to do so. Several factors
converge. What policy should the FTC seek to promote by issuing
press releases? Can it be served in alternative ways? How significant
are such interests as compared to the injury respondent may suffer
from the FTC's use of pretrial press releases? And finally, how should
the Commission resolve this conflict?
As we have noted, the justifications offered for the practice of issuing
press releases upon filing the complaint vary.115 The Commission relies
on the need to inform the public of its activities; 1 6 this policy apparently is based more on the desire for an informed electorate than on
the need to protect the public from the appeal of the charlatan or the
deception of the cheat. The courts, on the other hand, have emphasized
the purpose of the FTC Act-to protect the public; if the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected, the judicial view is that "it is essential that he be informed in some manner as to the identity of those
most likely to prey upon him . . . ,"117 Another reason, acknowledged
by FTC staff attorneys, is that such publicity puts pressure on actual
or potential agency respondents to comply with the law.118
Promotion of public knowledge about agency activities and protection of the public from an immediate danger are unexceptionable
policy objectives. Use of pretrial publicity as an in terrorem device to
coerce adherence to agency interpretations of unlawful conduct prior
to any adjudicative test before the agency, however, seems contrary to
the spirit of a fair trial and to the structure of the FTC Act, the FTC
Rules and the Administrative Procedure Act. 1 9 Congress has already
set forth the sanctions it believes appropriate for violations.
K.C. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.07 (1958, Supp. 1965).
115 Note, DisparagingPublicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1512, 1516-8
(1967).
116 See note 99 supra.
11t FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade
Cas.)
72,385, at 85,146 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
118 113 CONG. REC. A2291 (daily ed. May 9, 1967) (extension of remarks of Rep. Herbert
Tenzer); see Note, DisparagingPublicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLUA. L. REv. 1512,
1517 n.26 (1967); cf. Williams, Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission, 29 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 71, 78 (1965).
119 Moreover, such coercion may force respondents into acquiescing in questionable
114 See 1
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Alternative measures less harmful to private interests-post-trial
publicity or release of summaries of Commission activities without
specific identification of any respondent-would seem to provide adequate information to the public in its role as electorate. Press releases
naming the respondent may be justified only as to those practices
concerning which the public requires immediate warning. They should
therefore be limited to false advertising and deceptive practice charges
under section 5 of the FTC Act and the several fabric and product
labeling acts enforced by the FTC. Publicizing a complaint against a
respondent whose alleged practice does not create a need for specifically forewarning the public serves no conceivable purpose other than
punishment. Moreover, indiscriminate publicity of all FTC complaints
deprives the Commission of an effective voice where immediate public
notice is needed. After crying "wolf" for so many years, it is not surprising that the FTC's alarms go unheeded by the public. And protection rather than punishment is the only legitimate end of FTC
20
enforcement policy.
The inescapable conclusion seems to be that no legitimate purpose
is served by the current FTC practice of issuing press releases in all
cases when the complaint is filed; present policies should be changed.
The public does not need to be forewarned, for example, that The
Stanley Works, a leading producer of hardware products, may have
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring Amerock Corporation, a national leader in cabinet hardware;12 1 that Koppers Company
may have violated section 5 of the FTC Act by monopolizing the
production and sale of the chemical resorcinol; 122 or that others have
violated the Robinson-Patman Act. It is true that such publicity probably will not cause substantial or irreparable injury. These charges are
commonly the special concern of other businessmen or investors, not
the consuming public. And such interested persons are likely to read
publications which would ferret out such information from the Commission's public documents whether publicized or not. Publicity of
these cases tends to be ignored by the mass media, but this is not always
agency assertions with the additional unfortunate result that new legal theories as well
as unfounded factual assertions are neither scrutinized in an administrative trial nor
subjected to judicial testing. See Note, Disparaging Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67
COLuM. L. REv. 1517 n.29 (1967).
120 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade
72,385, at 85,145 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see Ekco Prods. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8122, [1963Cas.)
16,879, at 21,905 (1964); cf. United States v.
1965 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 826 (1961).
121 FTC Release (May 9, 1968); see Stanley Works, FTC Dkt. No. 8760, 3 TRADE

RrG. RE.

18,338 (1968).

122 FTC Release (Jan. 26, 1968); see Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755, 3 TRADE

REG. REP.

18,171 (1968).
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the situation. Moreover, the FTC's practice of providing respondent
with advance notice so that it can settle or prepare a simultaneous
reply,123 and the recently adopted policy of adding a cautionary note
to each complaint press release 24 minimizes any possible injury. But
lack of probable injury means only that no injunction would issue and
respondents are unlikely to seek judicial protection, not that an unwarranted press release practice should continue.
This still leaves open the matter of legitimate FTC press releases.
What policy should the FTC adopt for situations in which there is a
need to warn the public when the complaint is issued even though that
publicity is likely to injure respondent? As the recent tuna fish scares
and the famous 1959 cranberry episode demonstrate, agency publicity
prior to a final determination on the merits can severely damage respondent by destroying its reputation or cutting off its market, even
though respondent is later cleared of all charges. 1 25 "Wherever the
business success of an agency respondent is dependent upon good public relations, hostile publicity from the agency can pose a great threat
-- often greater than the threat of official agency sanctions."' 26 On the
other hand, there is a powerful public interest in protecting the consuming public from contaminated cranberries, botulism-infected tuna
fish, or fraudulent selling practices. And the FTC policy that press
releases will not be issued until the complaint is filed provides some
protection for private interests since complaints are filed only after
investigation reveals substantial cause and respondent has been given
127
an opportunity to settle the case.
123 See FTC Rules § 2.31; Pollock, Pre-ComplaintInvestigations by the Federal Trade
Commission, 9 ANTrRusv BuLL. 1, 7-10 (1964).
124 Beginning with the announcement of the Cinderella complaint, the FTC has added
the following explanatory note to its pretrial press releases:
(NOTE-A complaint is issued whenever the Commission has found "reason to
believe" that the law has been violated and that a proceeding is in the public
interest. It is emphasized that the issuance of a complaint simply marks the
initiation of a formal proceeding in which the charges in the complaint will be
ruled upon after a hearing and on the record. The issuance of a complaint does
not indicate or reflect any adjudication of the matters charged.)
96
FTC Release (March 3, 1967); see School Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8729 [1 517,868 (1967).
1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
As a result, the business papers and trade journals often insert the essence of this statement as well as material from respondent's press release in reporting the Commission
complaint. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1968, at 16. However, popular papers
do not. See, e.g., New York Times, Jan. 26, 1968, at 82.
125 See, e.g., Sanctions in Silhouette, lecture delivered by H. Thomas Austern at Harvard
Law School, March 22, 1960, quoted in W. GELLORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 671
(4th ed. 1960); Note, Publicity and the Security Market: A Case Study, 7 U. Car. L. REv.
676 (1940).
126 Note, DisparagingPublicity by FederalAgencies, 67 CoLua,. L. REV. 1512, 1515 (1967).
127 See authorities cited supra note 123.
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Perhaps there is no single answer to resolve this problem.128 The
most appropriate solution from respondent's view, an absolute prohibition on press releases, is too stringent a remedy. Similarly, compensatory relief is unavailable, and if the struggle to obtain compensation
for victims of criminal violence is indicative,12 9 is likely to remain so.
Current legislative proposals are equally undesirable. One would prohibit agency enforcement of its orders where pre-final order publicity
was issued "to discredit or disparage" respondent. 30 But this leaves the
public totally unprotected when protection is most needed-when respondent is engaged in unlawful practices, protects only guilty respondents, and offers no relief to innocent respondents damaged by such
publicity. Moreover, agency intent to harm is not necessary to injure a
respondent nor does it seem to bear on whether an innocent victim of
pretrial publicity should be compensated.
Another suggestion has been to give respondent equal time by permitting judicial modification of an agency order where pre-final order
publicity "did discredit or disparage" respondent unless the respondent "has been given an equal opportunity to publicize his comments
at the same time and in the same document in which the agency publicity was issued."' 31 Ironically, this proposal has been criticized for its
focus on the effect of adverse publicity rather than on an improper
agency purpose 32 ---which in fact seems its strong point if the realities
128 See Note, DisparagingPublicity by FederalAgencies, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1512, 1527
(1967), which observed that "[i]t is indeed rather hard to think of a constructive alternative
to the present judicial practice" and suggests that "[t]he greatest contribution Congress
can now make to a solution of the press release problem is to do nothing about it." But
see Lemove, note 93 supra.
129 E.g., S. 2155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 11818, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see
Comment, Compensationfor Victims of Crime, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 531 (1966).
130 S.518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess § 9(b) (1967) (proposed amendment of § 9 of the Administrative Procedure Act):
Publicity, which a reviewing court finds was issued by the agency or any officer,
employee, or member thereof, to discredit or disparage a person under investigation or a party to an agency proceeding, may be held to be a prejudicial
prejudging of the issues in controversy, and the court may set aside any action
taken by the agency against such person or party or enter such other order as
it deems appropriate.
'3' S. 924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (proposed amendment of § 9(c) of the Adminiistrative Procedure Act):
If a reviewing court finds that publicity which was issued by the agency or any
officer, employee, or member thereof, did discredit or disparage a person under
investigation or a party to an agency proceeding, that court may hold this to be
prejudicial error and may set aside any action taken by the agency against such
person or party or enter such other order as it deems appropriate. It shall not be
deemed prejudicial error, however, if such person or party has been given an
equal opportunity to publicize his comments at the same time and in the same
document in which the agency publicity was issued.
132 Note, Disparaging Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1512, 1526
(1967): "If the bill does refer to the effect, rather than the purpose, of agency action, it
is an overreaction to the problem it deals with."
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of agency practice are our concern. Yet, this proposal does seem undesirable since it calls additional attention to the issuance of the complaint (the essence of respondent's concern), and if respondent's
activities are dangerous or deceptive, the Commission ought not to
be a vehicle for promoting such practices by free publicity. (It would
not be unheard of, for example, for a respondent to maximize public
harm by quoting only that portion of the release which it prepared as
133
indicating FTC approval of its practices.)
But the problem of pretrial publicity is not insoluble. Where probable cause exists that respondent's practices are dangerous or harmful
to public health or safety, or are deceptive, but pretrial publicity also
may injure an innocent respondent unfairly, the simplest solution
would be to minimize respondent's harm and to prevent public injury
by giving respondent an option to discontinue the alleged practice
pending trial in lieu of the pretrial press release-as if a preliminary
court injunction were available. 34 If the respondent agreed to discontinue the practice, then the Commission would issue no pretrial
publicity (just as respondent's answer is unpublicized if requested).
It would be preferable if the FTC also were authorized to seek a preliminary injunction in federal court with which this policy could be
coordinated since this would eliminate problems concerning agency
authority or the effectiveness of respondent's promise. This proposal
has the advantage of protecting the public from the challenged practice, of serving the FTC's interests, and of permitting respondent to
avoid the harm of adverse publicity. This solution is not perfect.
Where the public harm inheres in the product-which is more likely
where the FDA rather than the FTC has jurisdiction-respondent may
be presented with only a Hobson's choice. But this suggestion seems
preferable to current practices or other proposals.
DISCOVERY

Pre-1961

Despite considerable pressure, the FTC, like most administrative
agencies, has been slow to recognize discovery as an appropriate pre133 Cf. Ro-Ed Eng. & Combustion Co., 28 F.T.C. 1787 (1939); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
215 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
134 Precedent for such informal agreements exists in the voluntary compliance program
where the Commission foregoes complaint prosecution and its attendant publicity upon
receipt of written assurances that the questioned practice has been stopped and will not
be resumed. FTC Rules § 2.21; see, e.g., FTC Release (June 19, 1968) (summary no. 26 of
matters dosed by assurances of voluntary compliance, not identifying respondents); 1965
FTC ANN. RE'. 17-18, 24, 27. See generally Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission:
Internal Organization and Procedure,48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 429-31 (1964); Note, Voluntary
Compliance: An Adjunct to the Mandatory Processes, 38 IND. L.J. 377 (1963).
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trial tool available to respondents in adjudicative proceedings. 13 5 Before 1961, a respondent generally had little or no opportunity to
discover complaint counsel's case before trial. (Discovery has always
been the special concern of respondents; Commission counsel were
seldom interested in the subject except to oppose it because they
already had the advantage of the precomplaint investigation and could
prepare their cases without further inquiry.) 136 Without discovery, respondent was at a distinct pretrial disadvantage. In preparing his case,
the respondent, even though aware of the Commission investigation
before the complaint was actually issued, had to rely on its own files
or on voluntary disclosures by third parties or the agency. Only during
trial could respondent compel the issuance of subpoenas. 137 This procedure had little to recommend it; it fostered delay, encouraged trial
by surprise, limited respondent's ability to detect and expose false
claims and arguments, increased the cost of FTC trials, and discouraged
pretrial settlements. 138 Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that
As late as 1963, the Administrative Conference concluded that:
Apart from the FAA, and to a more limited extent the FTC, none of these
[11 administrative] agencies with important enforcement powers provides in its
rules for any significant measure of discovery against the agency in administrative
adjudicatory proceedings.
S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1963); see Mezines 8: Parker, Discovery Before the
Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. REv. 55 (Winter-Spring, 1966). See also Manoli &
Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery Procedures, 18 AD. L. REv.
9 (Winter-Spring, 1966); Frankhauser & Belman, The Right to Information in the Administrative Process: A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 18 AD. L. REv. 101
(Winter-Spring, 1966); Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures Before the C.A.B., 18 AD.
L. REv. 157 (Winter-Spring, 1966); Ross, Discovery and the Federal Power Commission,
18 AD. L. REv. 177 (Winter-Spring, 1966); Note, Discovery in Federal Administrative
Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. R!v. 1035, 1041-58 (1964).
136 See, e.g., Creel, Pre-Trial Discovery and Motions, 14 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 23,
27-28, 31 (1959); Hier, Pre-hearingProceduresat the Federal Trade Commission, 11 AD. L,
BULL. 139, 142, 143 (1958).
137 The report of the Administrative Conference summarized the inadequacy of volun.
tary disclosure:
This is not to deny the truth of the frequent agency assertion that in fact they
voluntarily provide more information from their files than is required by their
rules. The difficulty remains, however, that where there is no regularized way of
securing data, except within agency discretion, complaints of unfairness will be
made, no mater how ill-founded in fact.
S. Doc. No. 24, supra note 135, at 132. See also S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1945) (legislative history of § 6(c) of the APA).
135

138 See REPORT

OF PRESmENT'S

CONFERENCE

ON ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE,

37, 71-72

(1953); 1 K.C. DAvis, ADMINiSTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 8.15, at 589 (1958) ('Probably no
sound reason can be given for failure to extend to administrative adjudications the discovery procedures worked out for judicial proceedings.'); Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up With the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960);
Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace With Modern Court-Developed Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1960); Howrey, The Federal
Trade Commission-PresentProblems and Suggested Changes, 10 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION
26.02[2] (2d ed. 1967);
40, 44 (1957); cf. 4 J. MooRE & B. GAIRFINKEL, FEDERAL PRACTICE
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Hatv. L. REv. 940, 944-6 (1961).
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respondent was not unfairly disadvantaged; under the interval hearing
procedure continuances were readily granted to permit preparation of
respondent's case or to prepare for cross-examination of complaint
counsel's witnesses. 13 9 Moreover, FTC rules did permit the taking of
40
depositions and interrogatories upon a showing of "good cause."'
In reality, however, such discovery was limited to preserving testimony,141 although hearing examiners occasionally exercised their discretion to permit information-gathering discovery.1 42 At best, then,
FTC proceedings were languorous affairs; at their worst respondent
was at a distinct disadvantage and a generation could pass between the
43
FTC's filing of a complaint and the final order.
But the FTC's refusal to give general recognition to pretrial discovery was not the only hurdle in the way of respondent's obtaining
agency-held information. Restrictive confidentiality policies were
equally troublesome obstacles. Before passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946, administrative secrecy commonly went so far
as to make it difficult to ascertain "even such nonsecret fundamentals
as agency organization, immediate and ultimate sources of authority,
and such absolute essentials as the procedural and substantive rules
governing agency action."1 44 Loosening of these shackles by the APA
did not open the gates to a flood of pretrial information, however, and
the agencies' conclusion that discovery is not required by the APA has
been sustained. 45 In addition, the FTC (and other agencies) protected
evidentiary files on grounds that across-the-board confidentiality was
necessary to assure the integrity of the administrative process and that
139 E.g., Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1537, 1539 (1960); see Standard
Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1954). But see Pacific Molasses Co. v. FTC,
356 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'g FTC Dkt. No. 7462 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
16,916 (1964).
TRADE REG. REP.
140 FTC Rules § 3.12(a), 20 Fed. Reg. 3063 (1955).
141 See id. § 3.12(d), 20 Fed. Reg. 3063-4 (1955); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc., 57 F.T.C.
1537 (1960); American News Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7396 [1959-1960 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP.
28,178 (1959).
142 See Gulf Oil Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1891 (1958); American Metal Prods. Co., FTC Dkt. No.
28,173 (1959).
7365 [1959-1960 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
143 See Connor, FTC Procedure Revisions: A Critique, 7 ViLL. L. REv. 359, 378-80, 384-8
(1962). The most extreme example of delay-part of it the result of court litigation rather
than agency proceedings-is Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959), where it took the FTC 15 years to get the "Liver" out of
"Carter's Little Liver Pills."
144 S. Doc. No. 24, supra note 135, at 123; see Note, The Federal Register and the Code
of FederalRegulations: A Reappraisal,80 HARV. L. REv. 439 (1966); Newman, Government
and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HAv. L.
REv. 929 (1950).
145 S. Doc. No. 24, supra note 135, at 123-32.
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the data were within work product or other privileges. 1 46 In other

words, disclosure was a matter for agency discretion rather than of
respondent right.
Post-1961

This framework of no pretrial disclosure of information to a respondent in an FTC adjudicative proceeding has changed. In connection
with pretrial discovery the change has been revolutionary. By comparison the change in confidentiality policies has been evolutionary.
Discovery policies had to be revised when the oft-interrupted adjudicative hearing became the exception in Commission practice upon the
147
FTC's adoption in 1961 of the judicial rule of continuous hearings.
Pretrial discovery became a question of fairness rather than FTC discretion. 48 Prehearing conferences were made mandatory in almost all
cases. 149 After experimenting with several tests, the Commission now
approves (at least temporarily) of pretrial discovery depositions if the
examiner concludes that they are necessary for development of respondent's case and will not cause unreasonable delay.18 0 Pretrial discovery
146 See FTC Rules § 1.133, 20 Fed. Reg. 3059-60 (1955); id. § 1.163, 27 Fed. Reg. 4614-5
(1962); id. § 1.133, 28 Fed. Reg. 7085 (1963); L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435 [196116,423, at 21,294 (1963); Shell Oil Co., 62 F.T.C.
1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
1488 (1963). See also Giant Food, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1193 (1961); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,
56 F.T.C. 1661 (1960); Thomasville Chair Co., 56 F.T.C. 1651 (1959); Pure Oil Co., 54
F.T.C. 1892 (1958); Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.T.C. 651 (1956).
147 FTC Rules § 4.14(d), 26 Fed. Reg. 6019 (1961), now FTC Rules § 3.41(b); see Universe
18,253, 18,310 (1968); ThermoChemicals, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8752, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,062 (1967).
chemical Prods., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8725, 3 TRADE REG. RE'.
148 E.g., Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
16,471 (1963); Connor, FTC Procedure Revisions: A Critique, 7 ViLL.
TRADE REG. REP.
L. REv. 359, 378 (1962) ("full disclosure is almost a requisite for a fair hearing now that
'trial by interval' has been abolished").
149 FTC Rules § 4.8, 26 Fed. Reg. 6017 (1961) (prehearing conference mandatory where
hearing likely to last more than three days, otherwise at examiner's discretion), now FTC
Rules § 3.21(a) (a five day test).
150 FTC Rules § 3.33; Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755 (Interlocutory Remand Order,
July 2, 1968). See generally Kintner, Recent Changes in Federal Trade Commission Discovery Practice,37 ANrrraus L.J. 238 (1968); Stewart & Ward, FTC Discovery: Depositions,
The Freedom of Information Act and Confidential Informants, 37 ANTTRUST L.J. 248
(1968); Mezines & Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. Rv.
55, 59-67 (Winter-Spring, 1966).
Although the Commission at first retained the "good cause" limitation on taking depositions, which it had previously followed under the interval-type hearing procedure (see
authorities cited notes 140 & 141, supra), it reinterpreted "good cause" as being satisfied
by "a showing of the relevance and usefulness for defensive purposes of the information
sought and of the need for eliciting it by deposition rather than by testimony at the hearings ....
" Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., supra note 148. When this test produced confusion
and a deluge of discovery appeals to the Commission, the FTC dropped the "good cause"
limitation and authorized examiners to grant the taking of depositions when respondent
demonstrated that the deposition would "constitute or contain evidence" without being
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subpoenas to obtain documents, much in the manner provided in
Rules 34 and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were also made
available to respondent. 151 And pretrial admissions of facts or exhibits
also can be sought.152 The Commission recently summarized its discovery rules as follows:
The rules for adjudicatory proceedings are intended to embody the Commission's conviction that, to the fullest extent
practicable, the strategy of surprise and the art of concealment
will have no place in a Commission proceeding. Hence, we
have also provided for thorough postcomplaint discovery procedures. It should be obvious that discovery is a two-way street
and that it is the hearing examiner's responsibility to insist
that both complaint counsel and respondent's counsel be provided with sufficient data to insure an expeditious and completely fair hearing.153
unduly burdensome or causing unreasonable delay. FTC Rules § 3.10, 28 Fed. Reg. 7088
(1963). Although hailed as authorizing purely discovery depositions, a literal interpretation
was suggested by the Commission. Compare Dixon, Significant New Commission Developments, 23 ABA ANTITRUSt SEar1ON 50, 58-9 (1963), with Kintner, Discovery in Administrative
Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 AD. L. Rav. 233, 241 (1964). See Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. v.
Tocker, 1963 Trade Cas.
70,932 (D.D.C.); Note, Discovery in Federal Administrative
Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1035, 1050 n.83 (1964). But see American Brake Shoe Co.,
FTC Dkt. No. 8622 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. JJ 17,318, 17,395 (1965).
Then, effective July 1, 1967, the Commission dropped this "evidence" test and authorized
depositions shown to be "necessary for purposes of discovery" which "could not be
accomplished by voluntary methods." FTC Rules § 3.33. Again, former FTC chairman
Kintner hailed these new rules as recognition by the Commission "[flor the first time ...
that depositions may be taken for discovery purposes." Kintner, Recent Changes in Federal
Trade Commission Discovery Practice, supra at 239. Others have pointed out, however,
that the requirement of a showing of necessity and unavailability of other methods for
obtaining the information as well as the direction that hearing testimony not be duplicated
by deposition, "if literally construed, reverses the trend in the direction of the civil rules
and may well have a 'chilling effect' upon the taking and use of depositions." Stewart &
Ward, supra at 249; see Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE
REG. REP.
18,102 (1967). This time Mr. Kintner's optimism was justified. Koppers Co.,
supra; see All-State Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. RE'.
18,103 (1967),
quoted in text accompanying note 153 infra; Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8680, 3 TRaDE R G. REP.
18,265 (1968).
151 Section 3.11 of the 1963 rules provided for production of documents in the manner
of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules. FTC Rules § 3.11, 28 Fed. Reg. 7088 (1963). Section 3.34
of the 1967 rules providing for discovery subpoenas supplants this provision-and extends
the former subpoena rule (FTC Rules § 3.17, 28 Fed. Reg. 7089-90 (1963)) by authorizing
"the fullest and most complete discovery practicable" through the use of subpoenas similar
to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules. FTC Rules § 3.34; Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC
Dkt. No. 8680, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,265 (1968); All-State Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738,
TRADE REG. REP. J 18,103 (1967); see Dean Foods Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8674 [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,521 (1966); cf. R. H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8650 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,344 (1965). The current deposition
rule also provides for the production of documents. FTC RuLEs § 3.33.
152 FTC RuLrs § 3.31.
'53 All-State Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE RaG. REP. 5 18,103, at 20,550
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The coordinate development of FTC confidentiality policies during
discovery cannot be summarized so succinctly.
Reaching the Question of Confidentiality
Confidential treatment may be sought in various contexts at the
discovery stage of FTC proceedings, and the context invariably affects
and often determines the protection afforded. Discovery can be engaged
in by Commission counsel or respondent; confidentiality may require
special treatment, nondisclosure, or limited disclosure.
Discovery by the FTC. When the FTC engages in discovery to
"round out, extend, or supply further details"' 54 for complaint counsel's case, the issue of confidentiality is indistinguishable from the
FTC's acquisition of information in nonpublic investigations and its
disclosure of sensitive data at adjudicative hearings. The Commission's
post-complaint discovery power is as broad-and as unaffected by the
sensitivity of the data-as its precomplaint investigative authority.6 5
Until the information is offered into evidence at the adjudicative hearing or is required for effective prehearing conference exchanges, the
statutory requirement (reinforced by Commission rule) that trade secrets
be kept confidential and that information in government files not be
disclosed except when authorized by the Commission, must be met.156
Nor were these restrictions removed by the recent amendment of section 3 of the APA. 157 On the other hand, hearing examiners now
commonly require that parties exchange witness lists and copies of all
exhibits before trial.158 Such disclosure, shortly before trial or at the
(1967) (footnote omitted); see id., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,503 (1968) (Supplemental and
Clarifying Opinion); Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order
Feb. 8, 1967) (Elman dissenting).
154 All-State Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. REP'.
18,103, at 20,550
(1967) (italics omitted); Marlo Furniture Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8745, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,268 (1968); Curtiss-Wright Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8703, 3 TRADE RE. REP.
18,133
(1967).
155 See Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957); FTC v. Waltham Watch Co., 169
F. Supp. 614, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum). See also Kaiser Indus. Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8341
[1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
15,765 (1962). But see United States v.
Assoc. Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The FTC's limitation of
complaint counsel's discovery prerogatives, therefore, is discretionary.
156 See authorities cited supra notes 68 & 76; FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605, 616 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957).
157 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)-(5) (Supp. IH, 1968); see Attorney General's Memorandum on
the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act 31-6 (1967). See also
STAFF OF SPECIAL SucomfMiTrEE ON

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OF HOUSE COsIMITrEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL STATUTES ON THE AVAILABILITY OF

INFORMATION (Comm. Print 1960).
158 FTC Rules § 3.21(a)(6); see, e.g., L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1544 (1963);
American Metal Prods. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7365 [1959-1960 Transfer Binder] TRADE RFG.
RE'. 28,173 (1959); Gulf Oil Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1891 (1958); cf. American Metal Prods. Co.,
58 F.T.C. 1165 (1961).
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prehearing conference, logically comes within the treatment of confidential information at the adjudicative hearing; that is, the burden
should be on the person proposing confidentiality, and considerations
governing whether confidential treatment is warranted at the hearing
are applicable. This is so since the only difference between these prehearing disclosures and those at trial is the timing, which has been
pushed forward to expedite the actual trial. 5 9
The remaining difficult and essentially unresolved problems of confidentiality during FTC discovery are: (1) Has the third party supplying the confidential information been given notice of the public
disclosure (so that it can request confidential treatment)? (2) Does the
information warrant confidential treatment at trial and hence during
pretrial? (3) What are the appropriate safeguards? These questions
have been considered elsewhere. 60
Discovery by the Respondent. Discovery by complaint counsel is the

exception rather than the rule, since the government's case is generally
completed during the investigative stage. Thus, the primary questions
of confidentiality at the pretrial stage occur during discovery initiated
by respondents. They seek information from other private parties or
third persons, from FTC files and personnel, and from other government departments.
In contrast to discovery by complaint counsel, discovery by respondent may raise questions of confidentiality at the time the request for
discovery is presented or enforcement of the request is sought.' 6' Private parties commonly object to discovery because they are respondent's
competitors and do not want to supply competitive information, trade
secrets, or other sensitive data under the guise of discovery.
Cf. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463 [1961-1963 Transfer Binder]
REP. 1 16,438 (1963) (Hearing Examiner Order).
160 See Cellhorn 408-23. Several of the measures proposed there to test and treat confidential material have recently been adopted by the FTC. See Lehigh Portland Cement
Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8680, 3 TRADE REG. REs'. 1 18,475 (1968); Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8755 (Interlocutory Order Aug. 14, 1968); id. (Hearing Examiner Order, Sept. 4, 1968);
id., 3 TRADE RiG. REP.
18,577, at 20,919 (Interlocutory Order, Nov. 1, 1968); see also
Cohn & Zuckman, FCC v. Schreiber: In Camera and the Administrative Agency, 56 GRo.
L.J. 451, 462-4 (1968).
161 Except for written requests for admission of facts or documents, all requests for
discovery in FTC proceedings must be made to the hearing examiner who determines
whether they are justified. FTC Rules §§ 3.31-.35. The notice procedure governing discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by the FTC only for
admissions. Id. § 3.31. However, application for discovery to the examiner "may be made
ex parte and, if so made, such applications and the rulings thereon shall remain ex parte
unless otherwise ordered by the hearing examiner or the Commission." Id. § 3.35(a); see
Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8680, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,322 (1968). But
see Kintner, Recent Changes in Federal Trade Commission Discovery Practice, 37 ArTITmusr L.J. 238, 242 (1968).
3.9

TRADE REG.
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When respondent's request is made of the FTC, other interests collide. The Commission needs to protect informants in order to keep
its channels of communication open with cooperating businessmen or
to honor confidences established in acquiring the information. FTC
files may contain the confidential business information of third persons
or of respondent's competitors; disclosure could seriously disadvantage
them and unjustly advantage respondent, the asserted law-breaker. It
would be anomalous, indeed, if an FTC finding of "reason to believe"
that respondent was violating the law (even though made as a result
of an ex parte proceedings) were to become respondent's license to
obtain competitive information without fear of self-disclosure. 162 Moreover, FTC's files may be privileged as the work product of complaint
counsel or as recording the internal workings and thought processes
of the agency; disclosure might inhibit such endeavors.
Whatever the justification for confidentiality, it is apparent that the
question of disclosure or special treatment of this information arises
immediately upon respondent's discovery request.0 3 The issue of
whether the data is sensitive-at least as to disclosure to respondentcannot be postponed. In addition, if respondent's discovery is accomplished by deposition, the transcripts are public when filed with the
hearing examiner; 16 4 in this instance the question of confidentiality
includes not only disclosure to respondent but also opening this information to the public.
162 Even though current FTC Rules limit consent negotiations generally to precomplaint
proceedings (FTC Rules § 2.34(d)), unless discovery is restricted or disclosure is prevented
by confidentiality policies, respondent could use FTC discovery to ferret out its competitors' secrets and then accept a cease and desist order to avoid self-disclosure.
163 See, e.g., Mississippi River Fuel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8657 (June 8, 1966) (unreported
decision); id. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,612 (1966) (order denying
petition for reconsideration).
164 Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP.
16,438 (Hearing Examiner Order 1963), reported in full in 14 AD. L.2d 161.
This ruling may no longer govern pretrial discovery, however. In Topps the examiner
relied upon the "open door" policy of public disclosure adopted by the Commission for
adjudicatory proceedings in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961), but FTC discovery now may be used for "pure" discovery in addition to evidentiary purposes. See note
150 supra. Thus, decisions of confidentiality during an adjudicative hearing do not
necessarily guide pretrial disclosure policy. Moreover, in Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8687, at 3 (April 10, 1967) (slip opinion), the examiner indicated that sensitive data
produced pursuant to an FTC subpoena "would be kept confidential prior to [its] introduction into evidence and at the time of introduction he would consider whether to
grant in camera status ...." See National Dairy Prods. Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8548 [19631965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,778 (1964); accord, Koppers Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8755 (Hearing Examiner Order July 9, 1968): "The transcripts of the depositions shall
not be filed in the public record pending 10 days notice to counsel for . . . [third party
deponents] so that he may move for a protective order ...." Where complaint counsel
is the requesting party there is no problem because until the documents "are offered in
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The Power to Decide
There apparently has never been any doubt that FTC hearing examiners are authorized to determine initially whether discovery of confidential information in private hands should be ordered and protective
procedures required. 16 5 Aggrieved parties or witnesses do have recourse
by interlocutory appeal to the Commission to overturn an examiner's
abuse of discretion, 166 and, if unsuccessful, to a district court to prevent
irreparable injury. 16 7 But, as the FTC has liberalized its discovery
process, it has also expanded the scope of the examiner's discretion,
and the objecting party now has a heavy burden to carry if it seeks
165
to reverse an examiner's discovery decision.
Until recently, this simple, orderly procedure did not govern respondent's request for information from FTC files (including complaint
counsel's files). As if seeking to confirm the layman's impression of the
administrative process, the Commission first created chaos and then
labored long to restore order and predictability to its confidentiality
policies. The FTC's extraordinary difficulties in deciding who should
decide whether and under what conditions, if any, the information
could be released to respondent, illustrate this point. Even though the
new FTC Rules issued on May 1 have now simplified matters, this
evidence or returned to respondents, counsel supporting the complaint will be subject to
the requirements of statute and Commission Rule that he treated them as confidential."
Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
15,830 (1962) (Hearing Examiner Order). This promise was inadequate for a district
court, however, which conditioned enforcement of the FTC subpoena on in camera treatment of respondent's sales figures. Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C.
1963). See FTC v. Continental Can Co., 267 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (requiring in
camera assurance in advance of production in Crown, supra). Thus, the Commission has
occasionally ordered complaint counsel and his expert witnesses to hold sensitive data in
confidence. Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,329 (1968).
165 See, e.g., FTC Rules § 3.34; id. § 3.17, 28 Fed. Reg. 7089-90 (1963); Crown Cork &
Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,828 (1967);
Mississippi River Fuel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8657 (Interlocutory Opinion, June 8, 1966);
id. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,612 (1966) (reconsideration of June
8 order denied).
166 FTC Rules § 3.35(b); see Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE RaG. RE.
17,828 (1967); General Transmissions Corp., FTC Dkt.
No. 8713 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'.
17,813 (1966); American Brake
Shoe Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8622 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,318 (1965);
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8643 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP.
16,471 (1963).
167 E.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 140-1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); R. H.
Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778, 782-3 (D.D.C. 1965); see FTC v. Continental Can
Co., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
168 Eg., All-State Indus. Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,103, at 20,550
n.4 (1967); Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP.
17,409, at 22,617 (1965).
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story, which has a Never-Never Land character, needs telling in order
to understand and evaluate substantive confidentiality rulings and,
perhaps, to discourage its repetition.
The 1961 FTC Rules continued the Commission's prior practice
of presuming that almost all information in FTC files was confidential
and should be released only upon a showing of "good cause." 16 9 The
rules provided that "the Commission may order" disclosure upon receipt of "an application" requesting release of the information from
the Commission's files. Earlier interpretations had held that the examiner had no authority to release Commission files; thus, applications
apparently were to be made directly to the full Commission. 7 0° The
only express exception in the rules involved prehearing conference
disclosures. 71' This rule, new in 1961, codified a long-established practice of FTC examiners to require complaint counsel to divulge the
names of his witnesses and provide copies of all intended exhibits to
173
respondent in advance of the hearing. 7 2 Then, in L.G. Balfour Co.,
the FTC reaffirmed the general policy of requiring Commission approval for all releases of file information, but added that the application
for release was to be made by respondent to the examiner who was to
169 FTC Rules §§ 1.133-.134, 20 Fed. Reg. 3059-60 (1955) (in effect in 1961); see Giant
Food, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1193, 1194 (1961).
In tracing the development of FTC confidentiality procedure at the discovery stage, the
various rule references in the cases are confusing until it is noted that the rule numbers
and contents have been changed often. In 1962 they were renumbered but not otherwise
changed (as §§ 1.163-.164); then in 1963 their earlier numbers were restored but the
decision procedure was altered. 27 Fed. Reg. 4609 (1962); 28 Fed. Reg. 7080 (1963). The
rules were renumbered, their contents altered, and the discovery portion separated from
general confidentiality rules again in 1967. FTC Rules §§ 3.36, 4.10-.11, 32 Fed. Reg. 8452,
8459 (1967). Finally, their content and decision procedure were altered once again effective
May 25, 1968. FTC Rules §§ 3.36, 4.11(d), 33 Fed. Reg. 7033 (1968).
170 Interpreting § 1.134 in Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.T.C. 651, 653 (1956), the
Commission held:
No other method for obtaining the release of confidential information is provided
for in the rules. It follows that the hearing examiner has no authority to require
the production of information or material from the Commission's files by a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise.
Accord, Thomasville Chair Co., 56 F.T.C. 1651, 1652 (1959).
171 [The prehearing conference may consider] matters as may aid in the orderly
disposition of the proceeding, including disclosure of the names of witnesses or
furnishing for inspection or copying of non-privileged documents, papers, books
or other physical exhibits, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
subject matter involved and which are in the possession, custody or control of
any party to the proceeding.
FTC Rules § 4.8(a)(5), 26 Fed. Reg. 6017 (1961) (emphasis added).
172 See authorities cited note 158 supra.
173 61 F.T.C. 1491 (1962); 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1545 (1963). The procedure had been suggested in Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 7946 (Interlocutory Order July 30,
1962), but as happens so often with procedural decisions of the FTC it does not appear
to have been reported. See also Shell Oil Co., 62 F.T.C. 1488 (1963).
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"recommend" whether "good cause" had been demonstrated and then
certify the application to the Commission, which would determine the
174
question de novo.
This cumbersome and time-consuming procedure, which emphasized
the Commission's apparent mistrust of its hearing examiners, was followed woodenly. The examiner was not entrusted with authority to
order disclosure of FTC files even when, as in Balfour, the documents
sought were originally obtained by the Commission from respondent's
very own files and confidentiality was due solely to their location and
75
not their contents.'
On the other hand, it was not dear that this duplicative procedure
had to be followed in every instance since the rules also provided for
discovery without regard to the location or custody of the documents
or information.1 7 6 If these discovery rules were exclusive of the confidentiality rules, as some argued, respondent's burden of proof for
disclosure, especially after the 1963 rules change, would be lightened
considerably. Instead of having to show "good cause" for the release
of FTC files, it would need to demonstrate only that the request sought
relevant documents or testimony and was specific and reasonable in
scope, 177 thereby entirely avoiding the question of confidentiality and
its test of good cause.
This conflict between the rule protecting FTC files and that granting
discovery to respondents arose indirectly in Furr's,Inc.178 when respondent sought clarification of its right to discover documents which complaint counsel might put into evidence. Although the Commission
remanded the case to the examiner with the admonition that docu174 In matters of this sort, the examiner's recommendation, because he is closer

to the issues involved in the proceeding, is entitled to considerable weight ...
Nevertheless, the Commission cannot substitute his judgment for its own particularly where, in the opinion of the Commission, he is not wholly correct. The
responsibility for release of confidential material is confided under the Rules to
the Commission itself.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 4 (Interlocutory Opinion Feb. 8, 1967)
(unreported slip opinion).
175 L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541 (1963). See also L.G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No.
16,635 (1963).
8435 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE RFG. Ri.
This procedure, moreover, introduced a double standard in the enforcement of merger
law under § 7 of the Clayton Act. In FTC proceedings respondent had to show not only
that documents in FTC files were not privileged but also that "good cause" supported
disclosure; whereas if the action had been brought by the Justice Department, discovery
would have been granted automatically in these circumstances. See, e.g., Crown Cork &
Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Opinion Feb. 8, 1967) (unreported dissenting
opinion).
176 See notes 150 & 151 supra.
177 E.g., Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
16,471, at 21,341 (1963).
TRADE REG. REP.
178 FTC Dkt. No. 8581 (Interlocutory Order Nov. 18, 1963) (unreported opinion).
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ments admissible in the adjudicative hearing on the public record
should not be protected during discovery, it was arguable that since
the Commission had not specifically limited its ruling to documents
intended as FTC exhibits, it had implicitly held that a hearing examiner could order production of documents in complaint counsel's possession without other authority from the Commission under his powers
to grant discovery. This interpretation, however, conflicted with dicta
in Balfour, decided just half a year earlier, that, aside from the limited
prehearing exception, the only manner in which confidential information could be released from FTC files was by the Commission application route.17 9
It was not until the Commission's decision in R.H. Macy & Co.,

80

almost two years later, that this question was resolved by a ruling that
discovery rules were subordinate to confidentiality policies and that
the rules were not in pari materia. This meant that if respondent was
to obtain information in complaint counsel's files it had to satisfy both
the discovery rules and the good cause requirement of the confidentiality procedure.
Confusion in the FTC bar and the opportunities for delay established by this two-step procedure resulted in numerous discovery and
confidentiality appeals to the Commission. As a result, the Commission
rewrote its confidentiality procedures three months after its second
Balfour decision, which had sought to clarify and spell out the required
procedure. The new rule added an exception to the Commissiondisclosure route:
Except to the extent that disclosure of such material or information is specifically authorized by the Commission or to the
extent that its use may become necessary in connection with
adjudicative proceedings, [confidential FTC files] may be disclosed, divulged, or produced . . . only under the procedure
181
[outlined in the rules and spelled out in Balfour]....

Instead of clarifying the procedure for obtaining a ruling on the
release of FTC files, this new rule further confused the issue.18 2 First,
179 L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1545 (1963).

967
96
17,344 (1965).
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
180 FTC Dkt. No. 8650 [1 5-1
Respondent had sought to subpoena internal Commission memoranda relating to its investigation of respondent while, at the same time, it asked for subpoenas ad testificandum of
three staff employees. The Commission held that since both requests were designed to
elicit the same information, the motions were to be disposed of in accordance with the
rules governing confidential information.
181 FTC Rules § 1.133(a), 28 Fed. Reg. 7085 (1963) (emphasis added).
182 This confusion is reflected in the comments of one examiner during oral argument
on a discovery motion:
I would like to see the question resolved as to what we're going to consider
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what material was "specifically authorized by the Commission" to be
released? Did this include information discoverable under FTC rules
without limitation as to location or custody? Second, what information
was "necessary" for respondent's case? Did necessity include information generally helpful to respondent's case? Under this two-fold exception the focus shifted from showing good cause (to the Commission's
satisfaction) to convincing the examiner that he was authorized to release the information because it was either specifically authorized or
necessary. The Commission's confidentiality caseload was not reduced.
Apparently, no case directly considered the first--"specifically authorized"-exception. Perhaps the argument that it encompassed all
discoverable information was too strained even for inventive antitrust
practitioners. In any case, as noted previously, the Commission's Macy
decision had dispelled any notion that information within the scope of
FTC discovery rules might be within the ambit of the first exception.
The "specifically authorized" exception appeared to be limited to prehearing conference disclosures and to material such as Jencks-type statements which the Commission had previously ruled could be disclosed
by an examiner's order. 183 Thus, the first branch of the exception
added nothing to prior practice.
The scope of the necessity exception-information in FTC files
"necessary in connection with adjudicative proceedings"-proved more
perplexing. It seemed significant that this exception was adopted as
part of a rules reform separating prehearing conference functions from
discovery. Conference disclosure was limited to documents to be "introduced in evidence" because discovery was expanded to include documents or information which "constitute or contain evidence relevant
to the subject matter involved."' 84 Reading these rule changes together,
it seemed clear that the examiner should order information released
from FTC files if he was satisfied that it was "necessary" for developconfidential files. That is everything that is not offered, is this a part of the
confidential file and if per se [it] is confidential because it is in the confidential
file. It doesn't seem to me the Commission can intend this.
Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682, Transcript at 2050, as quoted in Respondent's Request
for Plenary Consideration by the Commission of Certification by the Hearing Examiner
Concerning Commission Policies as to Confidential Files, Seeburg Corp., at 3, filed Feb.
2, 1967. However, the question was not ruled upon by the Commission in this case. For
a history of this skirmish, see Gellhom 427 n.141.
183 See notes 171 & 172 supra; Sun Oil Co., FTC Dkt. No. 6934 (Interlocutory Order
Sept. 15, 1958); Ernest Mark High, 56 F.T.C. 625, 632-3 (1959).
184 FTC Rules §§ 3.8, 3.10-.11, 28 Fed. Reg. 7087-88 (1963). The earlier prehearing
conference rule, § 3.10, 20 Fed. Reg. 3063 (1955), which paraphrased the corresponding
court rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 16, was used almost solely for consent order negotiations. See
Dixon, Practice and Procedure Before the Federal Trade Commission, 9 N.Y.L.F. 31, 56
(1963).
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ment of respondent's case or rebuttal of complaint counsel's allegations.185
Defining the positive limits of what was "necessary," however, proved
more troublesome. One commentator went so far as to suggest that
the necessity exception empowered the examiner to routinely order the
deposition of FTC staff members. 186 Respondents variously asserted
that the requisite necessity was demonstrated by showing that the information either was in complaint counsel's possession or was relevant to
18 7
respondent's case and not privileged.

Despite several Commission decisions, the outlines of the necessity
exception, as distinct from good cause, never became clear. Two staff
members suggested in a bar journal article that if the requested documents were to be introduced in evidence, they were not confidential
merely because they were located in the FTC's files; the production of
documents that were to be placed in evidence could be compelled by
satisfaction of discovery rules. 1 88 But this only repeated in another

context the effect of the express prehearing conference rule already
noted in Balfour. Then, in Viviano Macaroni Co., 8

9

the Commission

appeared to hold that complaint counsel's proposed exhibits did come
within the necessity exception. Though seemingly inconsistent with
its earlier Macy decision, only the label and rationale of Viviano conflicted with earlier rulings; the result under either view was that the
examiner had authority to order the release of FTC documents which
would be introduced into evidence by complaint counsel. The Commission also stated in Viviano that vital documents such as verbatim
copies of pretrial statements by government witnesses came within the
185 That the "necessary" exception was distinct from the "good cause" test of the confidentiality rule seemed apparent, especially in light of Balfour, where the Commission
generally defined "good cause" as requiring respondent to
satisfy the Commission not only that the material sought is relevant and useful
for defensive purposes, but also that its release would not impair an), overriding
public interest in preserving its confidentiality . . . . [taking] into account such
considerations as basic fairness to the parties and the need for avoiding delay.
L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546 (1963).
186 Note, Discovery in FederalAdministrative Proceedings,16 STAN. L. Rxv. 1035, 1049-50
(1964).
187 Royal Constr. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8690 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,722 (1966); Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8,
1967).
188 Mezines & Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. REv.
55, 71 (Winter-Spring, 1966); cf. Furr's, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8581 (Interlocutory Order Nov.
18, 1963); Texas Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8656 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
RE .
17,253 (1965). Protection in this instance depends on whether the sensitivity of the
documents, not their location, warrants in camera treatment during the hearing and a
protective order governing the limits of disclosure to respondent. Furr's, Inc., supra.
189 FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,467 (1966).
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necessity exception. 190 Once again earlier decisions had indicated that
such information could be released by the examiner. On the other
hand, Viviano and other cases held that necessity was not established
by "an assertion showing only a possible general helpfulness to a
respondent in preparation of its defense."'191 Nor would necessity be
found if the information was available from another source and respondent had not availed itself of compulsory process to obtain it.192
Thus, the necessity exception proved to be of little use in obtaining
access to files available under the "good cause" rule. Finally, in Crown
Cork & Seal Co., 193 the Commission failed to distinguish between the
necessity exception and the good cause requirement in ruling that
exculpatory material in complaint counsel's possession (and not otherwise available) which would weaken or rebut the prosecution's case
had to be disclosed.
At this point the boundaries of the exception appeared to have
joined the rule: "necessity" and "good cause" were virtually identical.
Moreover, the necessity exception had accomplished little since virtually all confidentiality questions were still being decided by the Commission rather than the examiners. Perhaps recognizing this unfortunate state of affairs, the Commission has relinquished its role of issuing
redundant opinions on the release of confidential FTC files. Since May
25, 1968, the FTC has granted its examiners authority to rule on all
questions of confidentiality at the pretrial stage. 194 It no longer matters
190 The exception in pertinent part relates to material and information which may
be necessary for use in connection with an adjudicative proceeding and this, in
general, includes that which complaint counsel must use in the presentation of his
case and other vital documents such as Jencks type statements.
Id. at 22,751; accord, R.H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8650 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP.
17,458, at 22,693 n.* (1966); Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No.
8624 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,532, at 22,803 (1966). But see id. at
22,822 n.22 (Elman dissenting).
191 Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 17,467, at 22,751 (1966); see e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 5
(Interlocutory Order, Feb. 8, 1967) (slip opinion):
A mere averment of need is not enough nor is it sufficient that respondent is
demonstrably in a position where he must of necessity defend himself against
charges contained in the complaint. This latter is true of every respondent and
hardly justifies a demand for virtually unrestricted access to the Commission's
confidential files.
192 E.g., Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682, at 5-6 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966)
(slip opinion); id. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,843 (1967); Crown
Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 6 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967) (slip opinion).
193 Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967). See
also Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,467, at 22,751 (1966); Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE Rr. REP. 17,409, at 22,614 (1965) (ruling on a confidentiality application under
the "good cause" test): "At the present time we agree there has been no showing of
necessity for the respondents ,to have such extensive access . . . ..
194 FTC Rules § 3.36. This rule change also authorized hearing examiners to issue
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whether the information is in the Commission's, the respondent's, or a
third person's files. The new rule may be having a salutary effect. In
the brief period since its adoption, the Commission apparently has not
been called upon to determine whether good cause exists for release
of FTC files-nor have FTC files been indiscriminately raided by
rulings of examiners in the meantime. In other words, respondent's
requests for materials in FTC files now are treated like all other discovery requests and are subject to the examiner's discretion, which will
be reviewed by the Commission if abused.
Disclosure of FTC Files to Respondent
Of course, empowering the examiner to decide all confidentiality
issues did not provide answers to the questions of greatest concern to
the parties: What information in FTC files is confidential? Will it be
released? Does it require protective treatment? The past confusion and
lack of direction in FTC confidentiality policies is nowhere illustrated
more sharply than in its ruling on requests for information from FTC
files. Nominally, the current test is identical to the pre-1963 discovery
standard-has "good cause" been shown for the release of the information? But the standard has a different meaning in the FTC file disclosure context. In discovery the focus was on whether the information
was relevant to the preparation of respondent's defense. 195 But, as the
Commission set forth in Balfour,'96 if a confidential file is involved
attention is focused on the additional factor of the "public interest
in preserving its confidentiality."
The quandary in which the Commission's application of this test
has placed the hearing examiner is illustrated by the examiner's comments last year in Seeburg Corp.:197
subpoenas commanding the appearance of Commission offidals or employees. Previously,
the examiner's authority to subpoena Commission personnel was limited to requests for
nonconfidential (and nonprivileged) information from them. See R.H. Macy & Co., FTC
17,844, at 22,503 (1965),
Dkt. No. 8650 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP.
appeal dismissed for lack of juris., R.H. Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C.

1966).
195

E.g., Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]

TRADE REG. REP'. 116,471 (1963).
196 See note 185 supra. It should also be noted that there is a third definition of "good
cause" applied by the FTC in determining whether testimony or exhibits in adjudicative
proceedings warrant in camera treatment. In that context the term requires a showing of
clearly defined and serious injury. See Gellhorn 416-23.

197 FTC Dkt. No. 8682, Transcript at 2048-9, quoted in Respondent's Request for Plenary Consideration by the Commission of Certification by the Hearing Examiner Concerning Commission Policies as to Confidential Files, at 3, filed Feb. 2, 1967. But complaint
counsel altered his opposition to disclosing most of the disputed documents and the FTC
did not accept the examiner's suggestion that it attempt to resolve this concern. Interlocutory Order (Mar. 27, 1967).
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Maybe it would be a good thing if the Commission looked
into this question of what constitutes confidential matter and
resolve[d] it and the basis for it. I would personally like to
know myself, because everyone seems to have somewhat a different version about it . .

.

but let's find out what the answer

to these things are and then maybe we'll all be thinking the
same way.
Nor have examiners (or the Commission) been aided by respondents
or complaint counsel. Each has taken hard and fast stands for or against
disclosure without suggesting appropriate criteria for determining
whether the documents warrant confidential treatment or require nondisclosure. Typical is the argument of complaint counsel in Crown
Cork & Seal Co.:'9 8

But in the case of this respondent, as has been the case in
the past, and as will probably be the case in the future, whatever complaint counsel have done for respondent as a class,
can never be enough ...
Additionally, respondent seeks, not specifically particularized documents for its defense, but general categories of
documents which may, or may not, be used in defense. Such
documents will, most assuredly, draw into this proceeding
third party documents consisting of confidential and privileged communications from individuals and companies which
desire to cooperate with the Commission as a respected Governmental agency, but which do not desire to submit information to the Commission when the Commission presumes
to operate, . . . as an agent for respondent, an alleged law

violator.
Doctrinal uncertainty makes it worthwhile to look at the current
rules and various decisions governing the disclosure of Commission
files on a functional basis: What type of information was sought? What
factors did the Commission rely upon to release, protect, or refuse to
divulge the data? Are any of the standards common to all types of
information? Do these decisions withstand critical analysis? Can more
rational criteria or alternative measures be suggested?199
198 FTC Dkt. No. 8687, Memorandum Brief of Complaint Counsel in Opposition to
Certain Certified Recommendations of the Hearing Examiner Regarding the Permissive
Scope of Respondent's Discovery, at 6, filed Nov. 9, 1966; cf. Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No.
8682, at 4-5 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966) (slip opinion) (ruling on motion for
production of confidential documents).
199 This account is necessarily selective. In addition to space and time limitations, it is
impossible to locate many FTC confidentiality decisions. Procedural decisions of hearing
examiners are almost never reported; those by the Commission are seldom published except
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Before looking at the cases, it should be noted that the FTC treats
as a question of pretrial discovery any attempt to obtain from its files
the testimony of government witnesses, although traditionally (for
example, in judicial trials) such inquiries are viewed as being within
the rubric of the testimonial duty.200 By contrast, disclosure of pretrial
statements of prosecution witnesses is governed by the "Jencks" rule.
These matters have been examined elsewhere 201 and will not be discussed further here.
FTC Rules. The current standard for release of FTC files by a hearing examiner is contained in three Commission rules-sections 3.34
(subpoenas), 3.36 (application to examiner for confidential Commission
records), and 4.11 (general policy on release of confidential records).
Read together, they require respondent to show that (a) the material
sought is relevant and not privileged, (b) the scope of the application
is reasonable, (c) the information is not available elsewhere, and (d)
the information is required by law to be made available or (e) its
disclosure is necessary in the interest of justice. Prior decisions have
filled in some of the details.
InformationAcquired by the FTC from PrivateSources. In releasing
information collected from private sources, the Commission's primary
concern is to preserve the integrity of its investigative procedures by
protecting documents entrusted to it while assuring that respondent
has available all information it needs to defend itself and to avoid
surprise. To show good cause in this circumstance, respondent must
20 2
specify the documents and demonstrate a need for them.
for internal staff consumption or to a select group. Nor is there a usable public index of
current confidentiality decisions available. That these practices violate the intent if not
the letter of § 3 of the APA seems obvious. 5 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III, 1968). See
generally Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 761
(1967). On the other hand, the Commission's lawlessness in failing to abide by these
statutory instructions does not appear to be subject to the judicial enforcement provisions
of the Act. Rather, the Commission cannot rely on prior unindexed decisions against a
respondent unaware of them-unless a court were to read the statutory enforcement
provisions as not precluding other judicial methods. See id. 783 n.56. Whether this
statutory limitation, imposed on the FTC as a result of its non-indexing of procedural
decisions, will ever have any significance seems doubtful. But the lack of an index has
meant that FTC decisions often fail to account for prior decisions. See, e.g., Gellhorn 429
n.153. Nor is it uncommon for the Commission staff to be unaware of prior Commission
rulings-at least this author has been called upon by staff attorneys to advise them of
earlier FTC decisions on procedural subjects.
200 See Gellhorn 423-7.
201 For a review of the FTC's application of the government-secrets privilege at the
hearing and of its rulings on prior statements of prosecution witnesses at the adjudicative
stage, see Gellhorn 423-33.
202 E.g., Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE R G. REP.
18,128 (1967); Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 4 (Interlocutory Order
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Relevance is established by describing the documents with as much
particularity as the situation permits and by showing why and how
they will aid respondent in meeting the charges. 20° The Commission
has repeatedly rejected statements by respondent that it "need[s] [the]
documents generally" 20 4 and has noted that attempts to rummage
through FTC files "merely for 'fishing' purposes to determine whether
material might be extracted therefrom which could be exploited by
the defense will not be allowed." 20 5 But the sufficiency of the description is not determined by an arbitrary formula. It is dependent on
respondent's knowledge, the nature of the charges, and, most important, respondent's demonstration of need.
Two cases illustrate these points. In Balfour,20 1 a case involving a

monopoly charge under section 5 of the FTC Act, respondents sought
documents obtained by the Commission from respondents, third party
documents obtained by the Commission from respondents' files, and
correspondence between respondents and the FTC. These documents
had been supplied by respondents over a period of more than thirty
years throughout a series of generally related FTC investigations of
their business activities. More than 700 of these documents had been
introduced during the interval hearings; 207 at least another 900 were
in FTC files.208 Respondents had searched their files and determined
that copies had not been retained. They also asserted that some of the
missing documents contained exculpatory material, but they could not
provide specific details to support this claim. There was no dispute
that these documents related to the issues of the case; the complaint
was "necessarily broad, covering a long period of respondents' business
life," and "the charge .. . [was] capable of proof and defense by an
Feb. 8, 1967) (slip opinion); Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer
17,467 (1966); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671
Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,505 (1966); L.G. Balfour Co., 61 F.T.C.
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
1491, 1492 (1962), 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546 (1963).
203 E.g., Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,128 (1967); L.G. Balfour Co., 61 F.T.C. 1491, 1492 (1962):
In analyzing the relevance of the papers involved, the examiner should be
governed by the charges made in the complaint. It is respondent's burden to show
why, and how, the requested documents will aid in meeting these charges.
204 E.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 6 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8,
1967) (slip opinion).
205 E.g., L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546 (1963).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1547 n.17.
16,635 (1963). In this sequel to
208 Id. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
the Commission's order that complaint counsel produce copies of respondent's documents,
the FTC held that complaint counsel had complied even though some of the 900 documents produced contained notations indicating that other documents existed; however,
they could not be found after a diligent search of FTC files.
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almost infinite variety of evidence." 20 9 In such circumstances, greater
specificity was not required.
Another indication of the flexibility of the relevancy requirement
is the Commission's decision last year in Crown.210 In this section 7
proceeding under the Clayton Act, respondent requested documents
relating to its proposed "failing company" defense. It hoped the documents would show that the acquired company was failing because of
inept management, obsolete machinery, dissension among the board
of directors, disloyalty of corporate officers, and an unsound financial
condition. Again respondent did not specify the documents with precision because it did not know their identity. However, it did list 55
persons and corporations who might have submitted information to
the FTC, and the Commission allowed the request for all documents
from these third parties relating to the specific failing company alle211
gations asserted by respondent.
These cases also demonstrate that the reasonableness of the scope of
respondent's application-the second requirement of the current rules
-is not determined by the number of the documents sought. Reasonableness, rather, is a balance of several factors. On the one hand, how
critical is it that respondent obtain these documents? Are they central
to the preparation or presentation of his case, or is it only possible that
some helpful information will be revealed?212 If respondent can develop similar defensive material in other ways, the examiner can be
expected to reject the request.213 On the other hand, the number of
documents may have a significant impact on whether the application
will be granted since discovery which will unduly delay the proceed209 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1547 (1963).
210 FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967) (unreported opinion).
211 The FTC order, however, was conditioned on respondent's showing that the information was not directly available from the 55 companies listed in its request.
On the other hand, where specificity is possible, the Commission has applied the
relevancy requirement strictly. E.g., Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651,
18,128 (1967).
8 TRADE REG. R.P.
212 In Crown, for example, the Commission chided respondent for saying in effect that
it may have bought a failing company without knowing that it was failing. "This plea
has little to recommend it except candor but we think its candor saves it. If respondent's
suspicions are correct and the company was in fact failing, it is important that that fact be
brought to light ... because it bears vitally upon the central issue .. ." of the case. Crown
Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 5 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967) (slip opinion)
(emphasis added). The Commission also was influenced by complaint counsel's implied
concession that some of the documentation would be useful to respondent when complaint
counsel admitted that he planned to use some of this documentation on cross-examination
to "keep them [respondent] honest," a surprise tactic which the FTC found objectionable
and inconsistent with current discovery practice.
213 E.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. 8687, at 6 (Interlocutory Opinion Feb. 8,
1967) (slip opinion).
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ings is disapproved by the Commission. 214 The Commission is aware
of the propensity of antitrust defendants to rely on discovery devices
to delay proceedings.
These standards of relevance and reasonableness are unexceptionable. Although one might quarrel with the rigidity of certain applications, they generally carry forward into the confidentiality context
the interpretation of similar discovery rules in Commission and judicial practice. 215 The same cannot be said for the requirement that
respondent show that the requested documents are not available to it
elsewhere. Unless similar information is already in evidence, 216 or the
documents sought constitute the underlying data supporting a complaint counsel exhibit, 217 the Commission has obstinately refused disclosure until respondent demonstrates that it is unable to obtain the
21 8
information from other sources by voluntary or compulsory methods.
It is here that the Commission's oft-criticized double standard on confidentiality comes into sharper focus. The Commission's analysis reflects this difficulty.
In protecting its files from respondent's claims, the FTC often argues
that confidentiality must be maintained so as not to imperil business
214 E.g., L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546 n.15 (1963) (citing authorities); see
18,128 (1967);
Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
cf. United States v. Assoc. Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). A recent
discovery case applying the same standard, Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt.
18,102, at 20,547 (1967), upheld an examiner's refusal to
No. 8651, 3 TRADE R1G. REI'.
issue subpoenas duces tecum and deposition discovery of 223 persons at respondents'
request; it would have required pretrial discovery depositions in 12 different cities and the
issuance of about 250 subpoenas. According to the Commission, respondents failed to
demonstrate that the examiner abused his discretion since they had not shown "that they
could not adequately defend themselves without the depositions requested . . . [or] that
there are no alternatives to the sweeping discovery demands made."
215 See note 177 supra and accompanying text; L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546
nn.14 & 16 (1963).
216 In Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682, at 2 (Interlocutory Order Mar. 27, 1967), the
examiner recommended disclosure of a third person's document because "there is no longer
anything secret or confidential about it 'since public record evidence has already been
received without objection relating to such acceptances.'" The Commission reluctantly
17,843
ordered disclosure. See also id. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. R P.
(1967).
217 Grand Union Co., 62 F.T.C. 1491 (1963); Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 62
F.T.C. 1518 (1963).
218 E.g., compdre Sperry & Hutchinson Co.j FTC Dkt. No. 8671 (Interlocutory Order
Sept. 28, 1966), with Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE Re.
REP.
18,128 (1967). However, if the third party prefers that the Commission divulge
the information, the FTC files will be released to respondent. E.g., Seeburg Corp., FTC
Dkt. No. 8682, at 5 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966) (not to be confused with an FTC
interlocutory order upholding consent order procedure issued in this case on the same
17,729); Libby-Owens-Ford Glass
date, id. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
Co., 56 F.T.C. 1661 (1960).
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confidence in the integrity of its files.2 19 According to the FTC, re-

spondents must first attempt compulsory discovery, often against many
persons, for material already collected by the Commission and compiled in one place (often with the aid of legal compulsion). Aside from
the inefficiency and burdensomeness of this approach, the Commission's

ready reliance on compulsory process in conducting its investigations
belies the soundness of its a priori argument that zealous FTC confidentiality policies are the touchstone of business cooperation. The
foundation of business cooperation in practice is the ever present and
viable threat of compulsion. 220 Moreover, as Commissioner Elman

correctly points out, as a result of the compulsory discovery requirement, respondent is not on a parity with complaint counsel with respect to available discovery since complaint counsel can demand docu221
ments of respondent even though they are available elsewhere.
Commissioner Elman has also noted that the requirement introduces
[relating to marketing strategies, technical, marketing
and purchasing experiences, and plans of customers and competitors] should not
be released by the Commission from its confidential files without compelling need.
Disclosing information from the Commission's files under a lesser standard would
necessarily engender resistance on the part of companies and individuals cooperating in Commission industry investigations. It would be likely to seriously retard
voluntary compliance with the Commission's efforts to obtain the data which it
needs in industry inquiries. Obviously, the cooperation which the Commission
has received in the past from business depends in large part on the confidence
of industry that confidential data submitted to this Agency will not be released
in an adjudicative proceeding unless specific and concrete need therefor has been
shown.
t .. * At this time no determination can be made that such data is unavailable
to respondent under these [discovery] procedures. Wherever sensitive data relating
to customers or competitors ... is concerned, respondent should utilize the procedures made available by the Commission's Rules to secure the data directly
from the source rather than from the Commission's confidential files. Under
these procedures, the third parties from whom information is sought are, of course,
entitled to state their views on the competitive implications of disclosing the
information requested and on the proper measures for preserving the confidentiality of the data produced pursuant to subpoena where such measures are
appropriate. . . . Certainly due process requires no more than that respondent
be able to secure evidence to present its defense. Respondent, of course, does
not have an unqualified right to demand confidential data from the Commission's
files at any particular time or stage in a proceeding.
Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682, at 5-6 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966) (slip opinion).
220 Compare Withrow, Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission-As Seen by
the PotentialRespondent, 29 ABA ANTrrRusT SECTION 81 (1965), with Williams, Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission, 29 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 71 (1965). The FTC's
business cooperation argument is also refuted by the Commission's rejection of a similar
argument by respondents. In denying discovery of third party documents to a respondent
who alleged that the third parties were hostile to respondent's desire to obtain the information, the Commission said: "We are not aware that friendliness and a spirit of cooperation
is a necessary precondition to the effectiveness of compulsory process." Crown Cork & Seal
Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 6-7 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967) (slip opinion); cf. Asso18,128 (1967).
ciated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
221 Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 6 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967)
(slip opinion) (dissenting opinion); FTC Rules §§ 3.33-.34; see All-State Indus., Inc., FTC
Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,103 (1967).
219 Sensitive information ...
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a double standard into the enforcement of laws administered by both
the FTC and the Justice Department. 222 If a merger case were brought
by the Justice Department instead of the FTC, the government would
have to produce unprivileged documents at the defendant's request
even if they were available-voluntarily or compulsorily-from third
persons. 223 "Surely the rights of a party charged with violating the
merger law should not be substantially diminished because the proceeding is brought by the Federal Trade Commission rather than the
Department of Justice." 224 Finally, this policy is contrary to the Commission's rationale that a primary consideration in determining
whether documents should be released is avoidance of undue delay or
unnecessary burdens on either party or on third persons. 225
The unfairness of the unavailability requirement was eloquently
226
summarized by Elman in Crown:
Why should such a requirement be imposed on a respondent?
It will take months for respondent to go through the laborious process of subpoenaing third parties in an effort to secure
copies of the documents in the possession of complaint counsel. And when the process is completed, how will respondent's
counsel know that they have gotten everything that complaint
counsel now have? Will there indeed be that "mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties" which
the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor said "is essential
to proper litigation"? And even if the answer could be yes,
what discernible public interest is served by stretching out
the prehearing process for this purpose? The advantage of
discovery is that it avoids all the burdens and delays involved
in obtaining from third persons documents which are readily
available and possessed by the other party. It seems to me that
the Commission fails to respect the spirit and letter of its own
Rules of Practice by denying discovery here.
222 See Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967)
(slip opinion) (Elman dissenting).
223 As a litigant-especially as the complaining party--the government is subject to
discovery like any other party. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82
(1958). Thus, only privileged documents are exempt from discovery. Documents which are
labeled confidential solely because of their location in a government agency's files are not
privileged and, therefore, are not protected from disclosure during discovery. United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 254 F.2d
314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1958). On the other hand, the question of privilege does become
critical in FTC discovery when respondent seeks FTC developed information. See text accompanying notes 248-81 infra.
224 Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687, at 6 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967)
(slip opinion) (dissenting opinion).
225 See note 214 supra and accompanying text.
226 Crown Cork & Seal Co., supra note 224, at 5 (dissenting opinion).
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Even if its factual basis is sound, the Commission's business cooperation argument is not a persuasive response. 227 Notice by the Commission (or respondent) to third parties that respondent is requesting their
documents from FTC files would provide them with an adequate
opportunity to object or to seek a protective order without subjecting
such third parties to the inconvenience of being directly involved in
the discovery process.
However, in applying the final requirement-that respondent show
that disclosure is necessary in the interest of justice228-the Commission
generally has exhibited the flexibility and imagination which justifies
continuing faith in the administrative process. The all-or-nothing approach of the unavailability test is abandoned. Instead, the Commission
has sought to strike a reasonable balance between assuring that information provided by third parties is not needlessly disclosed and making
needed information available to respondent for preparing and presenting its case. In doing so, the FTC has carefully examined respondent's
need for the data, weighed complaint counsel's comparative advantage
in having such information available, appraised the sensitivity of the
227 Nor is the Commission's due process analysis (quoted at note 219 supra) apt. It may
be true, as the FTC in effect argued, that due process does not require more than the
clumsiest FTC procedure which allows respondent to secure defensive evidence [see Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 142-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)], but this hardly justifies
cumbersome, time consuming practices when equally serviceable and more efficient alternatives are available. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
228 The scope of the alternative requirement-that "information to which the applicant
is entitled by law" will be disclosed (FTC Rules § 3.36(a))-loosely follows the fifth and
seventh exemptions to amended § 3 of the APA limiting required disclosure of internal
agency communications and investigatory files to matters routinely available to litigants.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) & (7) (Supp. III, 1968). Although these exemptions from the Information Act are not identical and raise several questions (compare Attorney General's
Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act
35-38 (1967), with Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
761, 794-7, 799-800 (1967)), this FTC Rule provision (§ 3.36(a)) apparently is limited to
prehearing conference disclosures, (e.g., names of complaint counsel's witnesses and copies
of his intended exhibits) and Jencks-type statements. See notes 171, 172, & 183 supra. See
also Sperry & Hutchinson Co v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 143-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). And the latter
need be disclosed only after the government witness has testified during the hearing. E.g.,
Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8777 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADEREG. RaP.
17,467, at 22,752 (1966). But see Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 (Interlocutory Orders Sept. 28, & Oct. 4, 1966). Because of these and other exemptions, amended
§ 3 of the APA probably will have little impact on disclosure of FTC files to respondent.
See Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TaDE REG. R aP.
17,729, at 23,055-6 (1966) (Interlocutory order upholding consent negotiation procedure):
The [Information] Act does not enlarge the discovery rights of a private party
engaged in litigation with the Commission to secure documents - . . which have
hitherto never been considered as subject to discovery in this Agency's proceedings.
id. at 7-11 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966) (unreported opinion denying production
of documents); cf. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 21 Ad. L.2d 254 (FCC 1967).
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data, and experimented with protective measures by limiting disclosure
to respondent's counsel or independent experts.
In its 1963 Balfour decision the Commission set forth the basic
standard for measuring respondent's need. Respondent must show that
the material would be "useful for defensive purposes" and that disclosure is consistent with "basic fairness to the parties and the need
for avoiding delay" while not impairing "any overriding public interest in preserving its confidentiality. 2 2 9 In Seeburg230 respondent urged
its compliance with this standard by asserting that its discovery of FTC
files was designed to test the accuracy of staff counsel's statistical proof
and to elicit evidence in support of respondent's theory of the case.
The Commission relied on the examiner's careful analysis of the particular request and denied the application on the ground that respondent had shown only the "generalized relevance" and "possible helpfulness" of the material.
Both Crown 2 31 and S & H, 232 by contrast, illustrate the type of

material which, if properly identified and not available elsewhere, will
be released. In Crown, the FTC indicated that it would release information in its files which might establish a failing company defense to
a merger law violation. In S & H, the Commission ordered production
of complaint counsel's correspondence with retailers who were not
called as witnesses against the trading stamp firm. S & H had asked to
inspect these documents on the grounds that "they tend to refute
229 L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546 (1963).
230 FTC Dkt. No. 8682, at 1 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966) (slip opinion): "It should

be noted at the outset that respondent has apparently had full disclosure of complaint
counsel's case, both with respect to the witnesses to be utilized, the documents to be
introduced, the underlying data supporting such exhibits, and the theory of the case."
See also Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. RE'.
17,505, at 22,780 (1966):
[R]espondent's chief purpose is not to seek specific documents or documents
respecting a specific defense which upon analysis might demonstrate good cause.
Rather, as the phrasing of its request indicates, it is asking for general access to the
Commission's confidential investigational files merely to see whether something
useful to its defense may turn up. This is clearly an insufficient ground for the
production of such records. Respondent has made no showing of any kind which
would constitute good cause for the requested access.
Nor is it "controlling that [the] applicant is of the view that access to Commission investigation files may assist [the] applicant in preparing its defense to the charges of the complaint."
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7643 [1959-1960 Transfer Binder] TaDE REG.
RE'. 28,615 (1960).
Cases decided since July 1, 1967, have yet not expanded the concept of "defensive use"
of FTC file material to include "pure discovery," but a consistent application of the discovery rules might require such an expansion if the other criteria of the confidentiality
rules were satisfied. At least there is no theoretical barrier to such an extension.
231 Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967).
232 Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 (Interlocutory Order Sept. 28, 1966).
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any inferrence [sic] drawn from unsupported documentary evidence
that respondent has unfairly restrained its licensees" from issuing extra
233
trading stamps-the essence of the Commission's charge.
The Commission's policy regarding the release of information obtained by it through special reports under section 6(b) of the FTC Act
further illustrates the Commission's emphasis on respondent's establishing its need for the documents to prove its case and to prevent
surprise as critical factors. In Mississippi River Fuel Corp.234 and Texas
Industries, Inc. 235 special reports obtained by the Commission as part
of an industry-wide informative investigation-and not for regulatory
purposes-were protected from disclosure because they had not been
made available to complaint counsel, who therefore had no unfair
advantage, and because the substantial cooperation the FTC was receiving during this continuing investigation reflected the reporting
companies' "expectation and understanding that these Reports would
not be released" for use in adjudicative proceedings. 236 But to the
extent that respondent's application in Mississippi River Fuel involved
documents identified by complaint counsel which were likely to be
placed in evidence in another complaint proceeding, the FTC directed
the examiner to reconsider the motion and recommend disclosure if
their relevance to respondent's case outweighed any need for secrecy.
Consistent with these rulings, the Commission ordered release of section 6(b) reports in Grand Union Co.237 and Columbia Broadcasting
233 BNA ANTrIRusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 274, A-3 (Oct. 11, 1966). The order, which
was issued during trial rather than pretrial, was justified as preventing further prolongation of the hearings since respondent's alternative was to subpoena persons from as far
away as Denver and Salt Lake City. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 4, 1966).
234 FTC Dkt. No. 8657 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,321, at 22,480
(1965): "Although it is possible ... that some of the documents may be relevant or helpful
to respondent in the preparation of its defense, this is insufficient to override the public
interest against disclosure." But when it was revealed later that complaint counsel had
access to some of the reports, the FTC remanded the matter to the examiner to determine
whether disclosure was necessary. See BNA ANTrrRussr & TRADE REG. REP. No. 295, B-4
(March 7, 1967).
235 FTC Dkt. No. 8656 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,253 (1965).
236 Id. at 22,352. Significantly, the Commission limited this ruling when it noted:
While we have determined that there is a very substantial public interest in

not releasing the Special Reports in question to respondent in this case, we would

do so if the needs of basic fairness so dictated. They do not .... [Since] no part
of these Reports has been or will be turned over to complaint counsel to be
introduced as evidence in this proceeding ....
denial of access to them on the
part of respondent is not a case of the Commission's denying a respondent
'access to evidence which it controlled.' [Citing Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v.
FTC, 233 F. Supp. 660, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)] .... All evidence in the possession of
complaint counsel will be subject to full discovery, which, under the Commission's

Rules of Practice, is available to respondent as well as to complaint counsel.
Id. (emphasis added).
237

62 F.T.C. 1491 (1963). Moreover, since the Commission required complaint counsel
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System, Inc., 23 8 where complaint counsel planned to introduce them
into evidence. The effect of this ruling was recently extended to include data collected by section 6(b) reports which were available to
complaint counsel even though he did not plan to introduce the infor2 39
mation into evidence.
Current FTC discovery rules suggest that "real or actual need" can
now be established by a mere showing that the information is likely
to be helpful to respondent's preparation of its case. But no reported
case goes this far.
Grand Union and CBS also illustrate the Commission's use of protective measures to allow release of information from FTC files to a
respondent while assuring confidential treatment of a third person's
sensitive business data. Respondent's counsel was permitted to examine, summarize, or copy the reports of competitors, but this information was not to be disclosed to anyone other than such counsel except
third parties (e.g., experts), approved by the trial examiner; the Commission specifically forbade disclosure to respondent. 240 Noting that
this protective procedure was not perfect, the Commission ruled in

Furr's, Inc. 24 1 that it was not applicable every time FTC files were
released. Rather, the effect of these restrictions on respondent's "practical and expeditious preparation of its defense" was to be balanced
against the sensitivity of the data, the likelihood of its ultimate disclosure on the public record at trial, and the need to prevent undue
242
delay or confusion in the conduct of FTC proceedings.
to produce approximately 180 reports even though he planned to introduce in evidence
only a tabulation based on 20 of them, the mere availability of § 6(b) reports to complaint
counsel may now justify disclosure.
238 62 F.T.C. 1518 (1963).
239 In Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8680 (Interlocutory Order), reported
in BNA ANTrrausT & TRADE REG. RIEp. No. 355, A-10 (Apr. 30, 1968), the FTC affirmed an
examiner's order for disclosure of a list of all acquisitions by Portland Cement companies
of ready-mixed concrete manufacturers for the years 1965-1968. Although part of the file
of an industry-wide investigation, the information could hardly be classified as sensitive.
240 See notes 237 & 238 supra. Apparently complaint counsel is to police these disclosures. Respondent's counsel was directed to provide Commission counsel with copies
of everything copied or noted from these files. All such copies and summaries, as well as
any additional notes made by respondent's counsel regarding these documents, were to
be returned to the FTC's files on termination of the proceeding.
Two commissioners professed little faith in these protective measures and dissented
because it was "manifestly unfair to subject the materials furnished by the various people
not parties to this action to examination by their competitors ..
" One of the dissenters,
Commissioner MacIntyre, also asserted that this procedure went beyond the needs of
due process and that the same ends could have been better achieved in other ways.
241 FTC Dkt. No. 8581 (Interlocutory Order Nov. 18, 1963).
242 On the other hand, the standard for determining whether protective measures
should be applied at pretrial should not be as stringent as at trial. There is no "public
interest" in disseminating discovery on the public record as there is in the case of trial
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Information Developed by the FTC. Not all information sought by
respondents from the Commission's files is acquired from private
sources. The release of file information developed by the FTC has been
the subject of numerous applications. However, except for copies of
statements by government witnesses which will be released to respondent during trial after they have testified, 243 the Commission's general
policy has been to deny the release of such information. The data is
of two kinds: information in the Commission's litigation file developed
for the complaint proceeding; and other nonlitigation documents. The
Commission's treatment of requests for these two kinds of information
is governed by different principles.
(a) Litigation documents. Probably the most sensitive of the litigation documents in FTC files are those identifying the person whose
complaint initiated or aided the FTC's proceeding against respondent.
Because of its heavy reliance on private complainants for information
of law violations warranting prosecution, 244 the Commission has zealously protected the identity of these informers from public or respondent disclosure. 245 The informant may be a volunteer or may have been
requested or compelled to provide information; his relationship to
respondent may be that of victim, competitor, accomplice, or knowledgeable but disinterested bystander. Whatever the basis of his being
an informer or of his relation to respondent, the Commission has asserted that confidentiality is necessary to encourage the continued
flow of this information.2 46 Otherwise future complainants might be
reluctant to come forward with information for fear of economic retaliation or of a decline in status in the business community.
evidence. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1964) (Antitrust Civil Process Act). But cf. 15 U.S.C. § 30
(1964) (Publicity in Taking Evidence Act). Discovery should not be sidetracked into
hearings on whether confidential treatment is warranted; counsel's professional statement
seems sufficent. The information may never be introduced into evidence so the trial
question may be irrelevant; and the objecting party's concern may not be with disclosure
to respondent but rather to the public at large. See note 164 supra.
243 E.g., Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt No. 8624 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
17,532 (1966); L.G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435 [1965-1967
TRADE REG. REP.
17,532, at 22,799 (1966); Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC
Transfer Binder] TRADE RG. REP.
17,467, at 22,750-1 (1966).
Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
See generally Gellhorn 428-33.
244 See note 11 supra.
245 E.g., Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP.
17,409, at 22,614 (1965); Texas Co., 60 F.T.C. 1887, dismissed for lack of juris.,
301 F.2d 662 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 822 (1962); Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp.,
54 F.T.C. 1885 (1957).
246 Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RP.
17,409 (1965). While the rationale of confidentiality supports only the secret identity of
volunteer informers, policy considerations of equal treatment for all informers suggests
that the Commission's blanket protection is appropriate.
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On the other hand, the informer may have information important
to the defense, and respondent may therefore have a legitimate, even
urgent need to know his identity. In this situation both the APA 247
and the due process clause would require disclosure if respondent cannot obtain such information by other means.
Judicial protection of the "informer's privilege" has recognized these
competing interests and ruled that
[w]here the disclosure of an informer's identity... is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause, the privilege must gave way.2 48
Similarly, the Commission's rules recognize that the usual standard of
strict confidentiality will be waived "as required by law." 249 Although
there have been indications in some antitrust prosecutions by the Justice Department that the scope of this exception is expanding, 50 no
respondent appears as yet to have been successful in demonstrating
good cause to the Commission for revelation of an informant's iden251
tity.
247 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(d), 556(d) (Supp. III, 1968); see FTC Rules § 3.41(c). In fact, the loose
language of amended § 3 of the APA would appear to require disclosure of an informer's
identity; but the commentators agree that the language will not be so interpreted. Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cms. L. REv. 761, 793 n.84 (1967);
Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administratiye Procedure Act 32-34 (1967); Stewart & Ward, FTC Discovery Depositions, The Freedom
of Information Act and Confidential Informants, 37 ANrraRUST L.J. 248 (1968); see Tobacco
Institute v. FTC, Civ. No. 3035-67 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 29, 1967), noted in BNA ANrIRUsT
& TRADE REG. REP. No. 334, A-11 (Dec. 5, 1967); cf. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
72,496 (D.D.C.).
248 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957); see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 309-12 (1967); Churder v. United States, 387 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967); Note, The Privilege of Withholding the Identity of an
Informer, 28 U, Per. L. REv. 477 (1967).
249 FTC Rules § 2.2(d).
250 United States v. National Steel Corp., (S.D. Tex. 1962), noted in BNA ANrrusT &s
TRADE RmE. REP. No. 49, A-1 (June 19, 1962).
The Supreme Court's leadership in this area has been in the criminal cases where the
balance between the need to protect and to disclose may differ from administrative
actions by the FTC. Presumably, the public interest in protecting the flow of information
is just as strong in the agency proceeding, although confidentiality may not be as critical
since self-interest is probably the motivation for most private complaints to the FTC.
However, respondent's right to prepare his defense is not as strong in the FTC hearing.
On the other hand, it is arguable that the government's position in an FTC prosecution
should be no better than a plaintiff in a private antitrust action who will be required
to disclose the sources of information on which his action is based. On balance, therefore, tests developed in criminal cases seem relevant to FTC proceedings.
251 As a practical matter, the disclosure of the complainant's identity is probably of
marginal interest to respondent-despite the vigor of their arguments for disclosure in
some of the cases. In the business context it usually is neither difficult to determine who
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A similar balancing of interests has been adopted by the Commission
in ordering disclosure of reports, memoranda, and notes prepared by
complaint counsel in the preparation of the government's case against
respondent. Again, in Hickman v. Taylor,252 the standard has been set
by the Supreme Court:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten ....
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop ....
And the interests of the

clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained
or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where
relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to
the preparationof one's case, discovery may properly be had.
Such written statements and documents might, under certain
circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to
the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be
useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. And
production might be justified where the witnesses are no
longer available or can be reached only with difficulty ...
But the . . . burden rests on one who would invade that

[attorney] privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify
production ....

This "work product" standard governs Commission proceedings. 253
has information needed to present a defense nor hard to guess the identity of the
informer.
252 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947) (emphasis added).
253 E.g., Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG REP.
17,467, at 22,752 (1966); Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,409, at 22,614 (1965).
Problems emerging from the assertion either of privilege or of the right to
"work product" should be examined in the light of principles established by the
federal courts, especially in those cases in the antitrust field dealing with the
validity of the claim of privilege or the application of the "work product" rule.
L.G. Balfour Co., 61 F.T.C. 1491, 1492-3 (1962). However, the Commission has indicated
that the scope of the work product protection of the files of its attorneys is greater than
that accorded in private civil litigation because complaint counsel are "government
lawyers acting in the public interest." Id., 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1546 (1963). This rationale,
however, also supports a contrary argument. See Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No.
8624 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'.
17,532, at 22,814-5 (1966) (Elman
dissenting). In any case, the FTC has ruled that "[d]ocuments coming within that [work
product] category will not be released without a strong showing of special circumstances,
good cause or necessity. The mere hope that such documents might prove useful does
not constitute such a showing." Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE PG. REP.
17,409, at 22,614 (1965); accord, R.H. Macy Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8650 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,344, at 22,505 (1965).
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Thus, exceptions have been made and production ordered of prehearing conference materials (e.g., the theory of complaint counsel's case,
his witnesses and exhibits, and so forth),254 statements of government
witnesses, 255 and correspondence with third persons where disclosure
is essential to a fair hearing, 256 but not of information disclosing the
FTC's reason for issuing the complaint. 257 In addition, a hearing
examiner has observed that Commission counsel have a duty to disclose
any exculpatory material in their files, however developed-but the
Commission does not appear to have emphasized this aspect of the
rule.2

58

On the other hand, because of its concern with the appearance

of fairness as well as fairness itself (since it acts as judge, jury, and
prosecutor), the Commission has occasionally ordered disclosure of
ex parte communications between the FTC and complaint counsel.2 59
(b) Nonlitigation documents. Respondent's recurrent demands for
other information in FTC files has proved more perplexing. In response to the recent amendment of section 3 of the APA, the FTC's
rules governing access to its nonlitigation files were rewritten making
all data available for public inspection except as specifically exempted.2

0
1

The exceptions are all-inclusive, however, encompassing

(a) records related to internal personnel rules and practices, (b) trade
secrets, names of customers, and commercial and financial information
which is customarily privileged or was received in confidence, (c) official minutes of FTC meetings, (d) inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda and letters, (e) personnel files, (f) investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes except as required to be released in adjudicatory proceedings, and (g) other files exempted by statute or executive
order. Aside from reversing the prior rules' presumption that all files
are confidential, these new rules appear to have made no substantive
changes. Release of such documents in adjudicative proceedings, then,
is dependent on satisfying the requirements of section 3.36 of the FTC
Rules.

2 61

See
See
256 See
257 See
254
255

authorities cited note 158 supra.
authorities cited note 243 supra.
notes 232 & 233 supra and accompanying text.
School Services, Inc, FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 8 TRADE

REG. REP.

17,978, 18,064

(1967).
258 Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682, Certificate of Hearing Examiner to FTC, at 1
(Feb. 3, 1967); see Gellhorn 424 nn.123 et seq., 427 n.141; cf. Canon No. 5, ABA Canons of
Ethics.
259 Compare Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,246, at
20,644 (1968), with Texas Co., 60 F.T.C. 1887 (1962).

260

FTC Rules §§ 4.9-.10.

See page [72] supra. Nonlitigants may seek such data pursuant to § 4.11 of the FTC
Rules by showing "good cause" for its release.
261
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Just as the thought processes of the agency cannot be probed by the
parties, respondent cannot demand file data reflecting the decisionmaking process of the FTC. The policy discussions of the Commission
or its officials and employees, as well as the minutes of their meetings
and memoranda reflecting such internal decisions, are privileged from
disclosure. This "executive privilege" is grounded in the necessity for
secrecy to induce candor in the process of consulting and advising FTC
22
officials.
Once again, this privilege of nondisclosure is not unlimited. Ostensibly, the Commission will weigh respondent's need for the documents
"against the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of information dealing with internal agency operations.1 263 In practice, however, this balancing has invariably led to denial of the application for
release. To be sure, the Commission sometimes has disclosed internal
documents when respondent has challenged the basic fairness of its
proceedings, but only when such disclosures revealed the propriety of
the FTC's actions. 264 Where respondent has asserted harassment or
discriminatory action, or sought data demonstrating that respondent
was arbitrarily selected for enforcement when an entire industry has
engaged in the challenged practice, the Commission has turned a deaf
262 With respect to minutes, memoranda, directives, recommendations or other

writings of the Commission or any individual Commissioner, these documents
relate solely to the Commission's function in reaching a decision. In effect, by
requesting these documents, respondent would inquire into the mental processes
of the Commission in determining the scope of the orders under investigation. In
denying the right to such inquiry, the Supreme Court in the Morgan case has
stated that "Such an examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial
responsibility. . . . Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, ...
so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected." In a case
involving the National Labor Relations Board, the court had aptly pointed out
that if information as to the deliberations of an administrative agency were made
public "The function of deciding controversies might soon be overwhelmed by
the duty of answering questions about them."
Modern Marketing Service, Inc., FTC Dkt. Nos. 3783, 4589 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REo. REP.
17,416, at 22,644-65 (1966), citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409 (1941), and NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1939); accord, School
17,978, 18,064 (1967); Sperry &
Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17,505
Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(1966); Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682 (Interlocutory Order Oct. 25, 1966); Graber
17,409, at
Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE R G. RaP.
22,614 (1965); see Coro, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8346 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP.
16,491, at 21,362 (1963), modified on other grounds, 338 F.2d 149 (Ist Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965).
263 Modem Marketing Service, Inc., FTC Dkt. Nos. 3783, 4589 [1965-1967 Transfer
17,416, at 22,645 (1966); cf. Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight
Binder] TRADE R G. Rat.
Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
264 E.g., L.G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE RaG.
71,070 (E.D.
RaP.
17,347 (1965). See also L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 1964 Trade Cas.
Va.).
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265

If the information sought is likely to support respondent's allegations, these decisions seem questionable. True, the FTC, like other
enforcement agencies, has discretion to determine its enforcement proear

gram and to select whom it will prosecute.2 66 To allow respondent to

challenge this determination at every turn would stall FTC prosecutions. On the other hand, the exercise of this discretion can be challenged if "patently arbitrary and capricious," 267 and, unless respondent
is permitted to obtain data in the FTC's files necessary to support its
challenge, this "right" becomes meaningless. In addition, the FTC's
combined function of prosecutor and trier-of-fact suggests that it
should view respondent's demand charitably.
Fairness also demands that the FTC establish specific criteria for the
release of file information.68 The Commission, for example, might
265 Clearly, an assertion of a difference in treatment alone does not create an issue

of the denial of due process.
R.H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8650 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP,.
17,344, at 22,504 (1965); accord, Coro, Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149, 152 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965) (respondent has no "right" to a particular administrative
treatment); see Modem Marketing Service, Inc., FTC Dkt. Nos. 3783, 4589 [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,416, at 22,645 (1966) (investigational hearing as
to respondent's compliance with an FTC order).
266 E.g., Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 4ii, 413 (1958); Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22,
28 (1st Cir. 1926); see First Buckingham Community, Ific., FTC Dkt. No. 8750, 3 TRADE
REG. RxE.
18,357 (1968).
207 FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250 (1967); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC,
355 U.S. 411 (1958). See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Jones, Industry-Wide
Enforcement, 10 ANTrrRUST BULL. 543 (1965); cf. Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLum. L. REV. i103 (1961).
268 Aside from relying on its "administrative discretion" and that respondent has no
"right" to a particular form of administrative treatment, the FTC has provided little
guidance. Commissioner Elman, in an eloqutent but otherwise only general dissent,
argues that the Commission should not stand on privilege.
If, in practical terms, the merits of a claim of bias and prejudice can be ascertained only through intramural inquiry conducted by agency members, this
imposes on them an even heavier responsibility. In short, I do not see how
agency members can escape the burden-onerous though it be-of satisfying the
parties and the public that they have taken a serious charge seriously, and have
canvassed the matter in all its ramifications and particulars.
R.H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt, No. 8650 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,344, at 22,507 (1965) (dissenting opinion). Former Commissioner Reilly's answer to
Elman's open-ended approach seems persuasive-although no excuse for a failure to seek a
middle ground. He points out that the decision to prosecute is a value judgment based on
many factors and a search of agency files probably will not disclose the correctness or
constitutionality of that judgment. (On this point Elman agrees, since evidence of bias or
prejudice is unlikely to make its appearance in written records.) Even more damaging is
the ease with which respondents could disrupt FTC enforcement proceedings.
If a mere ipse dixit assertion of partiality with limited knowledge such as that
available to respondent is sufficient to require an inquisition into the processes
whereby the Commissioners arrived at one result rather than another, the
formula for completely frustrating Commission effectiveness is clear.
Id. at 22,510 (separate statement of Commissioner Reilly). On the other hand, respondent
is unlikely to have concrete evidence of any unfair procedures without examining the
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advise respondent that release will depend upon whether (1) respondent has sought to delay or expedite trial of the case; (2) respondent's
charge goes to the fairness of the proceeding, of the prosecution, or
of the scope of the order (if the latter, the inquiry could be delayed
until a finding against respondent is made); (3) respondent has, if possible, substantiated its allegation to indicate the likelihood that such
evidence exists; (4) granting respondent's request will substantially
delay the proceeding. Free and open staff discussion does not confer a
license to conceal embarrassing information.
Less troublesome are FTG decisions refusing to reveal the basis for
the Commission's "reason to believe" that respondent is violating the
law;2

69

such information as supports the complaint will be disclosed in

pretrial discovery and during the hearing. Requests for file information
should not become a substitute for the adjudicative process. Nor should
FTC files be opened to determine the basis of the Commission's earlier
closing of the same or similar proceedings. 270 Past decisions and staff
interpretations of FTC policies need not govern current interpretations, although at some point the question of even-handed enforcement
will recur.2 71 The same reasoning holds for refusals to disclose staff and
FTC discussions of consent negotiations among themselves or with
respondent 272 or compliance reports submitted by it and other respondents.273 Refusal in these cases may also be buttressed by the familiar
justification of avoiding mischievous contentiousness which seeks irCommission's files. See Statesman Life Ins. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8686 [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. RES.
17,790, at 23,148-9 (1966) (Elman dissenting).
269 E.g., School Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8682, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17,978, 18,064
(1967); Shell Oil Co., 62 F.T.C. 1488, 1491 (1963).
270 E.g., Statesman Life Ins. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8686 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP'.
17,790 (1966); United Biscuit Co. of America, 62 F.T.C. 1536 (1963). However, such information may be relevant when fashioning the Commission's order.
271 Double Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1965); P. Lorillard
Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 55-6 (4th Cir. 1950); Statesman Life Ins. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8686
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REi,.
17,790 (1966); Texas Co., 60 F.T.C. 1887
(1962); Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.T.C. 651 (1956).
272 E.g., William H. Rorer, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8599 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP.
16,804 (1964), appeal dismissed, BNA ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. Rn'. No. 151,
A-7 (June 2, 1964); Seeburg Corp, FTC Dkt. No. 8682 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP.
17,729, at 23,055-6 (1966). Further, as the hearing examiner noted in Seeburg,
"the requested production of documents relating to the disposition of settled cases . . .
would be inappropriate and irrelevant since they are not reflective of the Commission's
policy but rather [are] a disposition based on the availability of the evidence in a particular case and a conservation of time in obtaining relief in the public interest." Hearing
Examiner's Certificate to the FTC, at 11-12, filed Oct. 3, 1966.
273 E.g., Modern Marketing Service, Inc., FTC Dkt. Nos. 3783, 4589 [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REc. REP.
17,416, at 26,644 (1966); Standard Motor Prods., Inc., FTC
Dkt. No. 5721 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,860 (1964); Dayton
Rubber Co., 62 F.T.C. 1519 (1963).
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relevant data, of preserving freedom for staff and agency action and
consultation, and, at the same time, of maintaining both fairness and
all its appearances. In general, it is difficult to fault the Commission's
performance here.
Not so satisfactory, however, is the Commission's refusal to release
internal studies prepared by its staff experts or to permit discovery of
its experts' opinions. In S & H 274 the FTC ruled that a report prepared
by its economic staff was not discoverable before trial. Respondent
sought not only the economic study prepared by the FTC's Bureau of
Economics, but also the underlying data which formed the basis for the
Bureau's study, including all communications received from retailers
and trading stamp exchanges and companies. In refusing discovery, the
Commission relied on the sensitive nature of the data and argued that
much of it came within the work product category. Good cause for its
release was said not to have been shown since if, as respondent asserted,
complaint counsel intended to present an expert witness or to rely on
the staff study, the examiner's prehearing order would permit discovery
(including the underlying data) "in ample time to prepare its defense."21
This argument misconceives the purpose of discovery.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has

in his possession. 27 6

Under the Commission's one-sided approach, however, information
acquired by its experts is available to respondent only if harmful to
him-in which case, of course, he will have no need for it. Certainly
the work product doctrine should not be extended to cover expert
274 Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
RF. REP.
17,505 (1966).
275 Id. at 22,779. The FTC also rejected, as unsupported, respondent's convenience
argument-that it otherwise faced the practical difficulty of investigating activities of
70,000 retail licensees and 400 trading stamp companies-and its contention that disclosure
would expedite the trial. The Commission concluded, however, that, "as the phrasing of
its request indicates, it is asking for general access to the Commission's confidential investigational files merely to see whether something useful to its defense may turn up."
Id. at 22,780.
276 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). In considering the Commission's ruling
in S & H, it should be noted that FTC discovery rules were not extended to include
"pure discovery" until 1967, a year after S & H was decided. But the current rules would
seem to require this analysis. In any case, the factual data of the Commission's economic
study as well as the expert's conclusions therefrom fit within the scope of the Supreme
Court's definition. See also Annots., 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1968), 86 A.L.R.2d 188 (1962), 77
A.L.R.2d 1182 (1961).
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information which it normally would not protect. 277 Nor would the fairness view of some courts in civil litigation-"that it is unfair for one
party, without expense, to obtain information from an expert who has
been hired by the opposing party for an agreed compensation" 27s--seem
applicable to administrative proceedings, especially where the staff
study may not be litigation-inspired. Moreover, as Commissioner
Elman has pointed out, this policy of secrecy is
inconsistent with a fundamental and paramount function of
the Commission. One of the main purposes for which this
agency was established was to conduct economic inquiries of
the kind which that report reflects, and to make the results of
such inquiries available to the public. 279
He also refuted the FTC staff argument that production of the report
would interfere with the free flow of information between the Commission and its staff:
The Division's staff consists of professional economists whose
obligation is to report data objectively and impartially, letting
the chips fall where they may .... To justify confidentiality
on the ground that our economists would not otherwise feel
free to submit such factual and impartial reports is to demean
their professional status. To keep a report confidential because it conflicts with a position being taken by the Bureau of
Restraint of Trade in an adjudicative proceeding would be
clearly arbitrary . . [and] would violate the fundamental
principle of justice and fairness which prohibits a Government agency from suppressing documents which may be critical to a respondent in making his defense. 280
Other decisions suggesting that Commission experts cannot be subpoenaed to analyze technical facts seem equally defective and contrary
to the purpose of an administrative agency as a repository of expert
28
information. '
277 Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REv. 455, 488 (1962). Although not asserted by the FTC, some courts have refused
disclosure of expert opinion under the attorney-client privilege; this too seems unsound.
Id. at 455-69.
278 Id. at 479.
279 Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP.
17,505, at 22,780 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
280 Id.
281 See Humble Oil & Refining Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8544 (Interlocutory Order Dec. 5,
1963); Standard Motor Prods., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 5721 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP.
16,860 (1964); Thomasville Chair Co., 56 F.T.C. 1651 (1959). See also K.C.
DAvss, ADMINiSTRATrvE LAW TREATsE § 11.08 (1958). However, in Standard Motor and
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Discovery by Respondent from Third Persons
As FTC discovery process available to respondent has been extended
to include not only evidence essential for its case but also information
merely helpful to its defense or rebuttal, the Commission similarly has
expanded respondent's ability to acquire sensitive information held by
third parties. This authorization has been further necessitated by FTC
adoption of the continuous hearing rule and its policy of restricting
disclosure of private information in its files to that which is not available from third parties. Under current rules, then, respondent may
apply to the examiner, in ex parte hearings, for documentary evidence
from third persons for the purpose of discovery, for obtaining evidence,
or for both purposes.2 8 2 Depositions are slightly more restricted. The
examiner has broad discretion to order such third persons to disclose
information to respondent as requested without regard to its sensitive
288
character.
Since respondent is under no duty to hold such information confidential-although sound trial tactics and insuring witness cooperation
may suggest that it do so-and, in the case of depositions, such information may be public when filed, 284 third parties often refuse to cooperate
without Commission or judicially compelled assurances of nondisclosure. At one time this assurance was obtained by refusing to disclose
the data without court enforcement of the FTC subpoena, at which
time the court would condition its order on a requirement of confidential treatment enforceable by its contempt powers. 285 But the
Thomasille Chair the Commission also concluded that the evidence sought by respondent
was not relevant to the issues in the case.
282 FTC Rules § 3.34. Prior to the May 1, 1968, revision, this rule did not clearly cover
production from nonparties; but shortly after the Commission so read the earlier rule, it
was revised to include nonparties specifically. See Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC
Dkt. No. 8680, 3 TRADE REo. REP.
18,265 (1968). As to the ex parte nature of the
subpoena application, see id. at
18,185, 18,322 (1968). On the other hand, the FTC
will not make available to respondent its broad investigative powers such as the power to
compel § 6(b) reports. E.g., American Brake Shoe Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8622 [1965-1967

Transfer Binder]

TRADE KEG. REP.

17,256 (1965) (citing cases).

See, e.g., Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,018, 18,053 (1907); Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8680, 3 TRADE RE.
REP.
18,265 (1968); Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order
Jan. 13, 1967). See also Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, 3 TRADE RE.
RiP.
17,935 (1967). Complaint counsel also have been warned not to advise third persons
not to cooperate with respondent's attorney in connection with confidential data sought
by respondent. See Best & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8669 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
Rio. REP.
17,585, at 22,852 (1966); see also id. (Jan. 13, 1967); Lenox, Inc., FTC Dkt.
No. 8718, 3 TRADE RaG. R P.
18,324, at 20,693 (1968).
284 See supra note 164.
285 E.g., FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir.
1957).
283
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Supreme Court has indicated that this procedure is inappropriate, at
least until the witness has produced the documents and the agency has
had an opportunity to rule on the witness's request with the sensitive
information before it.286 Thus, under the current rules, third parties
who wish to protect the information they are asked to disclose to respondent, from either public dissemination or their respondent-competitor's eyes, must seek a protective order first from the examiner.
The examiner, then, is to weigh this request in the same manner in
which he determines whether continued confidential treatment is warranted for private information from FTC files released to respondent.287 (It should be noted, however, that the only question is whether
that data is so sensitive as to warrant protective treatment; sensitivity
cannot justify nondisclosure.) If either party is dissatisfied with the
examiner's ruling, it may appeal to the Commission. But the FTC will
affirm the examiner's order unless it is shown that he has abused his
discretion.28 8 Finally, if the Commission refuses to order confidential
treatment, judicial protection to prevent irreparable injury which
cannot await a final decision in the proceeding is available in the district courts.

289

This procedure seems eminently sensible. One can only wonder,
however, why it took the Commission and the courts so long to adopt it.
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has examined the bases, objectives, and implementation
of FTC confidentiality policies at the investigative, pretrial, and hearing stage. Without repeating specific questions, comments, and sug286 FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
287 Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755 (Interlocutory Order Aug. 14, 1968); id. (July 2,
1968); id. (Hearing Examiner Order July 9, 1968); Mississippi River Fuel Corp., FTC
Dkt. No. 8657 (Interlocutory Order June 8, 1966), reconsideration denied, [1965-1967
17,612 (1966); National Dairy Prods. Corp., FTC Dkt.
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
No. 8548 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,778 (1964); see supra notes
160, 240-2 and accompanying text. For procedures of an earlier day, see Columbus Coated
Fabrics Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1888 (1957).
288 See authorities cited note 287 supra; Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755, 3 TRADE
REG. REP.
18,329 (1968); id. (Interlocutory Order Denying Appeal July 2, 1968) (this is
one of three orders and opinions issued in this case on this date by the FTC); Crown
Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,828, at 23,201 (1967); id. (Interlocutory Orders March 3 & April 10, 1967).
289 See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256
F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778, 782 (D.D.C.
1965). Some courts have not yet perceived the message of Schreiber and continue to
condition subpoena enforcement on assurances of confidential treatment. E.g., FTC v.
Continental Can Co., 267 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (the final chapter to the production
sought by respondent in Crown, supra note 288); cf. note 52 supra. This seems clearly
erroneous.
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gestions offered at various stages of this analysis, several observations
2
should be made.

90

The primary impression one obtains in examining scores of FTC
discovery cases involving questions of confidentiality (most of them
decided during the past decade) is that they are incredibly repetitive,
and their analysis is often limited to a few simple points. For example,
at least a dozen opinions state that FTC files will not be made available
to respondent without a showing (a) of "real and actual need" and
(b) of the unavailability of the documents elsewhere. But the first
standard does not suggest to respondent what it must show to demonstrate that the file information should be made available, and the
second requirement is inconsistent with the Commission's own discovery rules. In other words, the Commission's confidentiality decisions
(and rules) have been needlessly vague and their applications often
unjustified or inconsistent. Constant alteration of confidentiality procedures and FTC rules has contributed to the resulting confusion of
examiners and counsel. To be sure, some standards can be derived from
the cases, but here the unavailability of procedural decisions or of a
usable current index has prevented general understanding. Nor have
the parties sought to aid the Commission by suggesting rational alternatives. Commission and respondent's counsel, instead, have sought to
score argumentative points or, it seems, to create confusion by constant
and redundant appeals. Unconscionable delay, the obvious objective
of some, has been the result.
But even if this study contributes to the development of sound
policy, specific standards, or rational applications, there will continue
to be a need for more explicit rules and for streamlining the Commission's method of deciding confidentiality questions prior to the
final decision on the merits.
Obviously some delay is inherent in an adversary system where large
sums may be involved or critical data central to the future of a business
290 Despite the length of these two articles, they do not canvass all problems of confidentiality raised by FTC pretrial and adjudicative practices. For example, what of discovery by private litigants in a nonagency action who seek to discover materials from FTC
files? The Commission has indicated in dicta that one reason for public disclosure of
adjudicative hearings is to foster rather than discourage treble damage clamaints. See,
e.g., Carvel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8574 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE R G. REP.
17,128 (1964). But private discovery in a civil action is subject to a claim of executive
privilege. See Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346, 352-3 (5th Cir. 1965).
Likewise, Congressional requests for information, whether or not confidential, have not
been considered here. Cf. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966); Note,
Administrative Law: Congressional Criticism of FTC for Decision in Pending Case Held
to Deprive Administrative Litigant of Due Process, 1966 DuKE L.J. 779. Nor have requests
for confidential documents by the FTC from state agencies. See, e.g., Foremost Dairies,
Inc., 55 F.T.C. 2063 (1959).
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are at stake. But the current impasse of repetitive interlocutory appeals
to the Commission, sometimes of virtually identical confidentiality
issues in the same proceeding, is neither inevitable nor insoluble. One
might wish that counsel would be less contentious or more selective,
but that seems a vain and idle dream. Thus, rethinking of current
appellate procedures and experimentation with alternative approaches
seems warranted.
Current FTC provisions for review of an examiner's interlocutory
confidentiality rulings follow two routes in addition to the usual review
available when his initial decision on the merits is rendered. If the
question involves release of FTC files, the examiner's decision, whether
for or against disclosure and with or without protective treatment, can
be appealed to the full Commission and apparently is automatically
reviewed.2 91 Or, the Commission may on its own motion review the
examiner's decision on the release of its files.29 2 But if the examiner's
ruling concerns the disclosure of confidential data directly from respondents' or other private sources, an appeal
will be entertained by the Commission only upon a showing
that the ruling complained of involves substantial rights and
will materially affect the final decision, and that a determination of its correctness before conclusion of the hearing is essen293
tial to serve the interests of justice.

Despite numerous changes in these provisions over the past five years,
the essential test for review has remained unchanged. In actual practice, appeals of confidentiality decisions are either granted as a matter
of course or decided by an opinion holding that a sufficient showing
for appeal has not been made. The heavy burden on the Commission
of hearing and deciding procedural cases seems intolerable; it appears
to have contributed to the FTC's reliance on general statements and
inadequate opinions.
The Administrative Conference has recommended amendment of
section 8 of the APA to permit agencies greater flexibility in reviewing
an examiner's initial decisions. 294 After reviewing this recommendation
and other alternatives, Professor Auerbach concluded that the administrative agencies should be permitted "to experiment with different
ways of delegating the decision-making function and [of] reviewing the
291
292
293

F C Rules § M.S6(d).
Id. § 3.36(e).
Id. § 3.35(b).

294 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

Ist Sess. 153-6 (1963); see id. 157-63.
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decisions of their delegates,1
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the hearing examiners. While those

studies concentrated on review of an examiner's final decision, the
lessons of this study suggest their applicability to review of FTC procedural decisions.
In an attempt to meet the need for consistent confidentiality rulings,
for the development of rational standards of disclosure and protective
treatment of sensitive data regardless of whose data it is or where it is
located, and for expediting final decisions on procedural rulings,
several recommendations can be made. First, the FTC's new rules
authorizing hearing examiners to make the initial determination of
all confidentiality questions clearly seem to be an important step in
the right direction. It should not be reversed. Second, an automatic
right to appeal by either party to the Director of Hearing Examiners
should be allowed; in addition, the Director should be authorized to
review an examiner's decision on his own motion, when it appears inconsistent with Commission policy, if neither party seeks review. (Such
review should not interrupt the discovery process or trial of the matter
unless specified by the Director.) Unless the Director's decision reverses the examiner's ruling or modifies it so as to constitute an effective reversal, appeal to the Commission should not be granted routinely
except when the Director certifies the matter as involving a significant
question not previously ruled upon by the Commission. Third, one
Commissioner should be designated to oversee such (and perhaps other)
procedural rulings and to hear appeals where the Director reverses the
examiner or when he has certified the question. This decision by one
Commissioner-authorized

by the

1961

Reorganization

Plan 2 9 6-

should be final, except, perhaps, in the unusual situation where his decision would conflict with FTC Rules which, in his opinion, need
change.2 9 7 In the latter case, review by the full Commission should be
available on certification of the question by the "procedure" Commissioner to the full Commission.
While adding additional appeal steps for deciding novel questions,
this suggested structural change in the appeal route has the merit of
295 Aijerbach, Scope of Authority of Federal Administrative Agencies to Delegate Decision Making to Hearing Examiners, 48 MINN. L. REv. 823, 866 (1964). See also Note,
Intermediate Appellate Review Boards for Administrative Agencies, 81 HARV. L. Rltv. 1325
(1968); Long, The Proposed New Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEo. L.J. 761, 771
(1967).
296 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 6191 (1961). The Commission has
made only sparing use of this authority. See Delegation of Functions, 27 Fed. Reg. 481-2
(1962); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,
48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 417 (1964).
297 Of course, interlocutory judicial review in the federal district courts would be
available to prevent irreparable injury. See notes 288 & 289 supra and accompanying text.

1968]

Confidential Information

assuring consistent application (as far as an institutional structure can)
of FTC confidentiality policies at the discovery and trial level and of
deciding most questions below the "full" Commission level. Both the
Director and single Commissioner would develop sufficient knowledge
and expertise in these difficult questions to allow more thoughtful and
careful exploration of the ramifications of their decisions; hopefully,
it also would permit experimentation with alternative approaches. In
addition, it would free other Commissioners to concentrate on more
significant policy issues and to meet criticism of the FTC's enforcement
planning. On the other hand, this suggestion need not be instituted
wholesale. Individual changes could be tried piecemeal and extended
only as shown to be workable. Nor is it the only way in which to
accomplish these ends. But it does seem clear that further experimentation with current appeals procedure is required. Finally, no structural
modification can eliminate the need for general publication of all FTC
procedural decisions and for the development of a current index avail29s
able to practitioner and examiner alike.
Although one must hesitate before recommending still another
change in the FTC Rules, nevertheless, this study has shown that
clearer standards could be set forth in the Rules and that inconsistent
provisions such as the unavailability requirement in section 3.36 need
to be eliminated. Further, Cohn and Zuckman have presented a cogent
case for adding specific Rule directions that in camera procedures be
required until any decision is made as to whether protective treatment
298 The reforms suggested here actually would not significantly vary the formal structure currently applied by the Commission to interlocutory appeals. For at least the past
five years Commissioner MacIntyre has been designated the "motions" commissioner to
whom all interlocutory appeals are presented for review and decision. He apparently has
full power, delegated by the chairman, to decide such appeals in the name of the Commission. Interview with John V. Buffington, Assistant to FTC Chairman Dixon, July 29,
1968. However, except for the most routine requests for time extensions, Commissioner
Maclntyre has declined to exercise his authority and has instead referred all questions
which might raise controversy to the full Commission. For this reason several FTC staff
members have candidly questioned the feasibility of the proposals offered here; FTC
practitioners and academic observers have been more optimistic.
Perhaps this staff skepticism is justified. On the other hand, it also reinforces the point
that structural reforms will not, by themselves, correct procedural abuses. Inordinate
appeals, interminable delays, and inconsistent or irrational rules and decisions are neither
inevitable nor incurable, but they will not be eliminated until some agreement is reached
as to the aims and implementation of FTC procedures. Cf. Suburban Propane Gas Corp.,
FTC Dkt. No. 8672 (Interlocutory Order June 8, 1968). Federal courts facing similar
problems have surmounted most of them, and the Commission's current willingness to
listen to suggested changes, to be receptive to reason, and to experiment with procedural
reforms (as illustrated by Rules' development) belies staff pessimism and renders their
doubts unpersuasive. See, e.g., Lehigh Portland Cement Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8680, 3 TRADE
RE. REP.
18,475 (1968); Koppers Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8755, 3 TRADE Rla. REP.
18,577
(Interlocutory Order, Nov. 1, 1968).
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of sensitive data is warranted. 2 9 But before another revision is attempted, the Commission should consider adopting a different method
of drafting its rules. At present, revisions are accomplished within the
agency and in secret session. 00 Comments of FTC practitioners,
scholars or others are not solicited. Nor are any interpretations or
"notes" such as utilized in the revision of federal and state court rules
provided. All these suggestions should be considered and, if feasible,
a joint staff-practitioner-academic committee established to rewrite and
recommend FTC practice rules. The final decision, of course, would
still be the Commission's.
299 Cohn & Zuckman, FCC v. Schreiber: In Camera and the Administrative Agency, 56
Gao. L.J. 4O1 (1968).
300 Preparation of the FTC's [July 1] 1967 -rule revisions was assigned to a sevenman committee drawn from the Commission's top-level staff. Its chairman was
John V. Buffington, assistant to the Chairman of the Commission, and its other
members were the six bureau chiefs. Inquiries concerning the preparation of the
rules elicit the response that no further information will be released concerning
the committee, its recommendations to the Commission, or changes, if any, made
by the Commission itself in the committee's proposals. However, it is known
that subordinate bureau staff members did much of the actual drafting of the
proposals submitted by the committee.
BNA ANTiTRUSr & TRADE REG. RaP. No. 321, B-1 (Sept. 5, 1967).

